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Dissertation
ABSTRACT
Technological advances have dramatically increased the types and quantity of 
intellectual and useful commercial innovations. The significance of intellectual 
creation and innovation leads to increasing claims for rights over the tangible 
values that they capture and generate. With the example of debates surrounding 
patents on information and communication technologies (ICT), five essays col-
lected in this volume look into a particular coordination problem of fragmentation 
that the claims and right to patent held by many actors cause. In ICT industries, 
sheer number of rights and claim holders may fragment the rights and technology, 
and may discourage efficient use of innovation. Coordination of the fragmented 
claims, before, during and after the rights are granted, may ameliorate the nega-
tive impact. However, as exclusive rights influence incentives and coordination 
both negatively and positively, this research claims that provision of a governance 
mechanism is as important as exclusion provided by right. 
The presence of fragmentation highlights the significance of a governance 
mechanism to continuously coordinate the interests of the multiple claim-holders 
and users in the process of innovation. Governance mechanism may be provided 
by various institutions - legislation, court, administrative agencies and private 
parties in the market. Thus, this dissertation claims that a solution to coordinate 
fragmented patent rights ultimately needs to first resolve a question of institution-
al choice. Regardless whether the solution is private ordering, utilizing the formal 
and informal creation of norms in the market, or public ordering, involving vari-
ous institutions of the law, the judiciary, and administration, a single-institution 
centric solution inevitably downplays the role of alternative institutional arrange-
ments that minimize the impact of fragmentation. In conclusion, the research 
calls for an institutional comparison on both positive and negative impacts of 
institutional arrangements, ultimately entrusting the institution at less imperfect 
position with a particular decision making competence. 
Key words: Patent Law, Exclusion, Governance, Coordination, Fragmentation, 
Institutional Comparison.
ABSTRAKTI
Teknologinen kehitys on lisännyt voimakkaasti immateriaalisten ja kaupallisesti 
hyödyllisten innovaatioiden määrää ja lajeja. Innovaatioiden ja immateriaalis-
ten luomusten merkittävä rooli johtaa lisääntyviin vaateisiin oikeuksista niiden 
tuottamaan ja hyödyntämään konkreettiseen arvoon. Käyttäen esimerkkinä in-
formaatio- ja kommunikaatioteknologian patentteihin liittyviä kiistoja, viisi tä-
hän teokseen koottua esseetä tarkastelee useiden toimijoiden hallussa olevien 
vaateiden ja oikeuksien aiheuttamaa erityistä koordinaatio-ongelmaa – sirpa-
loitumista (fragmentoitumista). Oikeuksien ja vaateiden haltijoiden suuri määrä 
voi IT-teollisuudessa pirstoa oikeuksia ja teknologiaa ja siten jarruttaa tehokasta 
innovaatioiden hyödyntämistä. Sirpaloituneiden vaateiden koordinointi voi oi-
keuksien myöntämistä ennen, sen aikana sekä sen jälkeen lievittää fragmentoi-
tumisen kielteistä vaikutusta. Koska yksinoikeudet vaikuttavat kannustimiin ja 
koordinaatioon sekä kielteisesti että myönteisesti, hallintamekanismilla varautu-
minen on yhtä tärkeää kuin ulkopuolisten poissulkeminen. Fragmentoituminen 
lisää hallintamekanismien merkitystä monien vaateiden haltijoiden ja käyttäjien 
jatkuvassa koordinoinnissa innovaatioprosessin aikana. Hallintamekanismeja 
voivat tarjota erilaiset instituutiot – lainsäädäntö, tuomioistuimet, hallintoelimet 
sekä markkinoiden yksityiset toimijat. Siksi on koordinoitaessa fragmentoitunei-
ta patenttioikeuksia ensin tehtävä institutionaalinen valinta. Riippumatta siitä, 
onko ratkaisuna tukeutuminen markkinoiden muodollista ja epämuodollista 
sääntelyä hyödyntävään yksityisautonomiaan tai julkiseen sääntelyyn, joka hyö-
dyntää erilaisia oikeudellisia instituutioita kuten lainsäädäntöä, oikeuslaitosta 
tai hallintoa, yhteen instituutioon keskittyvä ratkaisu vähättelee sirpaloitumisen 
vaikutusta vähentävien vaihtoehtoisten institutionaalisten ratkaisujen roolia. 
Lopuksi tutkimus peräänkuuluttaa institutionaalisten ratkaisujen myönteisten 
ja kielteisten vaikutusten vertailua ja mahdollisuutta antaa päätöksentekovalta 
sille elimelle tai toimijalle, joka parhaiten kykenee selvittämään parhaan mah-
dollisen ratkaisun.
Avainsanat: patenttioikeus, yksinoikeus, hallinta, koordinaatio, fragmentoituminen 
(sirpaloituminen), institutionaalinen vertailu
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Part I.  
Overview and summary

1. Introduction
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
In the past few years, technological advances have dramatically increased the 
types and quantity of intellectual creation and useful commercial innovations. 
The significance of intellectual creation and innovation leads to increasing claims 
over the tangible values they capture and generate. In response to this, intellec-
tual property laws in major industrialized countries have expanded the subject 
matter to include most human endeavors.1 These expansionist changes in law 
have raised concerns about their potential negative impacts not only on the sci-
entific and research communities but also on competition and innovation. 
One impact of expansionist change in intellectual property is the emergence 
of multiple stake-holders surrounding a particular innovation or technology. In 
other words, a quantitative increase in the protectable subject matter has led to 
a quantitative increase in the claim-holders, before, during and after the right is 
granted or acquired. Subsequently, unless there is a proportional increase in the 
doctrines in law that allow access and provide exceptions to the users, the expan-
sion unilaterally increases the quantity of the stake-holders in a right, either as 
licensee or as potential infringer. 
Fragmentation is a result of a combination of changes in the legal context and 
increasingly global modularization of production and competition in the market 
place. The changes in laws and competition in the market place and the quantita-
tive increase in claim-holders and users make fragmentation of rights covering 
one technological area nearly inevitable. In certain industries where research is 
cumulative and the development incremental, fragmentation of rights is believed 
to cause an underuse of intellectual works and technology.2 Thus firms and pri-
vate actors are required to devise various institutional measures to strategically 
manage and transfer valuable commercial information, without having to resort 
to the protection and enforcement of intellectual property. 
Additionally, with the development of information and communication tech-
nology (hereinafter ICT), firms increasingly globalize their operations and modu-
larize the production process, from product design to development and offering. 
Furthermore, as patent subject matter now includes various aspects of human 
endeavor and processes, the use of the invention is no longer limited to the firm-
1 See, among others, Lee, Nari (2005), The Patent Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the Emergence 
of Proprietarian Norms - The Patent Eligibility of the Business Methods. 45 IDEA, The Journal of Law 
and Technology 321. 
2 Details are elaborated in Publication 3 in this book. See also  Heller Michael A. &  Eisenberg, 
Rebecca. S. (1998). Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research. Science 
280, 641-78; Shapiro, Carl (2001) Navigating  the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and 
Standard Setting, IN: Jaffee, Adam, Lerner, Josh, and Scott Stern eds.  Innovation Policy and The 
Economy, Vol.1, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), MIT Press; 119-150.  
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based industrial exploitation. For example, in the case of computer program and 
business method related inventions,3 the inventive process does not necessarily 
require high investment costs or production facilities. It may simply require an 
ingenious computer programmer who is skilled in the art.  At the same time, in-
novation in this industry can be used regardless of the location of its tangible 
production facilities. Innovation in the ICT industry is produced, used and com-
mercialized on a truly global scale. For example, any innovation utilizing the 
Internet or a communication network implies multiple geographical points where 
the users can be located. In this sense, the actual uses and exploitation of the in-
novation are increasingly fragmented. 
To regulate the uses and exploitation and to settle disputes over the uses of 
exploitation, national legislative and judicial institutions are pressured to devise 
rules to pool these fragmented uses and exploitation of innovation into coordi-
nated and governable right that can be adjudicated in a forum. In sum, fragmenta-
tion of rights and the uses brought forth by the recent changes in market practices 
and the law highlight the importance of coordination in the study of intellectual 
property. This study focuses on the interaction between the fragmentation caused 
by the expansion of exclusive rights and coordination of fragments.
 
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
This dissertation consists of two parts. Part I, including this introduction, presents 
an overview of the research topic and the overall findings of the research. Part II 
consists of five essays discussing particular aspects of the research topic. 
Part I is divided into three main sections. The first chapter, in Section 1.1, 
provides background and the starting point of the research. Section 1.3 identifies 
the gap in the previous research and provides motivation for the study. Section 
1.4 sets out the research objectives. Section 1.5 describes the methodology gen-
erally used in intellectual property law research and the relevant methodology. 
Chapter 2 describes and summarizes individual essays. The final chapter, Chapter 
3, incorporates the individual research findings of the essays and presents the 
theoretical and policy implications of the research. Additionally, limitations and 
further relevant research questions and oversights are discussed in Chapter 3, to 
suggest a research agenda for a follow-up study. 
Part II is composed of five research papers published between 2005-2009, in 
different forums and publication series, examining different aspects of the re-
search topic.  Each essay is structured differently and the research motivation 
for each essay is different. However, they commonly study fragmentation of a 
patent right and the uses of the underlying innovation and how patent law treats 
the problem of fragmentation. In particular, fragmentation and coordination in 
patent law is studied from the point before the right is granted, ex ante, until the 
point where a patent right is granted and enforced, ex post.
3 Supra note 1. See also Shapiro (2001), supra note 2.
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1.3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
1.3.1. Theories on Intellectual Property 
Creative expression and invention, which are the core subject matter of intellectu-
al property rights, are intangible. Furthermore, they often have what economists 
call the characteristics of public goods, such as air and public defense system. 4 
This means that the use of knowledge is non-rival – use by one person does not 
preclude use by another. While production is costly, once it is produced, it does 
not require additional resources to reproduce them. For the society, maximum 
efficiency may thus be achieved by promoting sharing by the most.5 However, the 
intangible and fluid nature of knowledge is such that once produced, it is difficult 
to exclude its uses by others. Without any means of exclusion or any means 
of recouping the costs of production, there will be free-riding of the benefits. 
This, in turn, decreases incentives to produce. In other words, externalities 
and the dissipation of the benefit would lead to underproduction of this type of 
goods. Thus, the market for knowledge will not be formed without institutional 
interference because of the lack of an incentive to produce and disclose.
The right of exclusion provided by the law of intellectual property is often 
explained as one such institutional arrangement which allows a market to be 
formed.6 The exclusive right of intellectual property provides a legal means of 
exclusion that deals with the problem of incentives and dissipation of benefits 
due to free-riding.7 This market-based solution through the exclusive right of 
property is deemed to be the least intrusive or a more efficient form of solving the 
problem of underproduction compared to such alternatives as public production, 
private patronage, public subsidy, and prizes.8 The classic role of the intellectual 
property institution is understood as providing incentives to produce and transfer 
innovation and creation by grants of exclusive property rights. As such, it either 
complements other incentivizing mechanisms that exist in the market or creates 
incentives where such law-driven incentives are necessary to solve the problem 
of underproduction. 
This economic explanation for having an intellectual property right often 
forms the foundation for the theorization and normative justification of the in-
tellectual property law. However, the superiority and efficiency of the intellec-
tual property law over other means of providing incentives have been repeatedly 
questioned by scholars. Scholars, both in law and economics, have repeatedly 
engaged in finding a general theory to explain and assess the efficacy of the in-
tellectual property institution. As fully explained below, in Part II, this enquiry 
has generated volumes of work, but a generally applicable theory of intellectual 
4 See for example, Scotchmer, Suzanne (2004) Innovation and Incentives, MIT Press at 31:  Foray, 
Dominique (2004) Economics of Knowledge, MIT Press at 113-130.
5 See Foray (2004), supra note 4 at 116.
6 See Foray (2004), supra note 4 at 109, also at 131-164, Scotchmer  (2004), supra note 4 at  31.
7 See Tamura, Yoshiyuki (2006), Chitekizaisan Hou [Intellectual Property Law] 4th edition, Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, explaining the system of intellectual property rights from the point of incentive. 
8 For a discussion of these alternatives, see Kingston William (1987) ed Direct Protection of 
Innovation. Dordrecht: Kluwer, and Foray (2004), supra note 4. 
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property either claiming or disclaiming its overall superiority over other institu-
tional arrangements still does not exist.9
Regardless of the absence of a coherent uniform theory, the intellectual 
property has now become part of most countries’ system of property rights, 
partially due to the WTO-TRIPs agreement obligating WTO member states to 
provide a minimum level of protection for seven types of intellectual proper-
ty.10 The absence of a general theory justifying the intellectual property rights 
despite the pervasive adoption of these rights begs the question of fundamental 
justification. Thus over the years, a majority of the legal research on intellectual 
property theory rightfully starts from the justification for and against general 
intellectual property protection.11 However, as the laws of intellectual property 
are considered complex, more often the majority of the works have been written 
on a particular interpretation of a domestic intellectual property law and a posi-
tivistic description of the law and changes in it, and court decisions. Foreign case 
laws and legal concepts in foreign doctrines are introduced as a way to provide 
an alternative way of constructing a domestic concept that may later be used in 
describing domestic case laws.12 
As interests surrounding intellectual property became more politicized, more 
commentaries started to acknowledge the global political dimension of the intel-
lectual property law and critically assess the impact of exclusive rights in na-
tional and global economies. For example, researchers critically questioned the 
justification for introducing new types of subject matter for protection,13 and for 
introducing new intellectual property-like rights.14 Likewise, commentators were 
9 See among others, Oddi, A. Samuel (1996) Un-unified Economic Theories of Patents – the Not-
Quite-Holy-Grail, 71 notre dame l. rev. 267; Lemley, Mark A. and Burk, Dan L. (2003)  Policy Levers 
in Patent Law. 89 Virginia Law Review, 1575 at 1595-1630, discussing heterogeneous theories of 
intellectual property both in economics and law; and Mazzoleni Roberto and Nelson, Richard (1998) 
The benefits and costs of strong patent protection: a contribution to the current debate, 27 Research 
Policy.273–284, reviewing four strands of economic theories. For details see Publication 1 in Part II 
of this book, below.  
10 WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 28, Apr. 15, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. For a commentary on the TRIPs agreement, 
see Friedrich-Karl Beier, and Schricker Gerhard (ed.) (1996) From GATT to TRIPs : the agree-
ment on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, IIC studies, Vol. 18 Weinheim: 
VCH Verlagsgesellschaft; and Gervais, Daniel (2008) The TRIPS Agreement, Drafting History and 
Analysis, 3rd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell.
11 See Drahos, Peter (1996) A philosophy of Intellectual Property. Aldershot: Dartmouth;  Merges, 
Robert P and Ginsburg Jane C. (2004) ed. Foundations of Intellectual Property: Foundation Press. 
Hettinger E.C. (1989) Justifying Intellectual Property. 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 31.; Hughes 
J. (1988) The Philosophy of Intellectual Property. 77 Georgetown Law Journal 287.; Lemley Mark 
(2004), Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129.
12 This seemingly pragmatic way of using a legal concept thus may fall short of what Coleman calls 
a pragmatic conceptualism, as it does not involve any conceptual analysis. Coleman Jules (2001) The 
Practice of Principles, In defence of a Pragmatic Approach to Legal Theory. Oxford University 
Press.  
13 See, for example, in patent, Lee (2005), supra note 1, Burk, Dan L. (2000) Patenting Speech, 79 Tex. 
L. Rev. 99;  Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, Antonina (forthcoming) Jurisdictional and Institutional Aspects 
of Stem Cell Patenting in Europe (EC and EPO), In Torremans P. and Plomer A. (eds.) Embryonic Stem 
Cell Patents: European Patent Law and Ethics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming), review-
ing and discussing the controversy over patenting new aspects of human endeavor. 
14 See, for example, Lessig, Lawrence (2000). Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? 52 
Stan. L. Rev. 987, discussing privacy protection as intellectual property, and Reichman J.H. & Pamela 
Samuelson. (1997). Intellectual Property Rights in Data? 50 Vand. L. Rev. 51, discussing intellectual 
property protection in data. 
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sceptical toward an extension of duration of existing rights,15 which may or may 
not be normatively justified at the national or international level.16 
Most intellectual property research is still involved in the task of theorizing 
the best means to achieve an optimal mix of incentives of exclusion and access to 
innovative knowledge and creation. In patent theorizing, scholars also increas-
ingly started to use various concepts of economics and property theories, such as 
monopoly17, patent prospects,18 competitive innovation,19 cumulative innovation,20 
anti-commons21 and patent thickets,22 to model the innovation process and ana-
lyze the impact of patent law on innovation, and vice versa.23 On the other hand, 
the absence of a unifying theory may indicate that a general theory of intellec-
tual property may be so general that only agreement on the goals of the intel-
lectual property system can be made, and not the precise means to implement 
such goals.24 This may explain why there are various heterogeneous theories to 
describe, justify, explain and sometimes propose to emulate exclusive rights of 
intellectual property.25 
Another explanation for the heterogeneity of theories may be that institutional 
arrangements surrounding the uses of intangible resources require policy con-
siderations beyond the incentive of exclusive right balanced against disclosure 
15 In the discussion in the US, the term extension led to a dispute over the constitutionality of the 
particular legislation, Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); 
for commentary and discussion, see Samuelson, Pamela (2003) The Constitutional Law of Intellectual 
Property After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. Cop. Off. Soc’y 547. In Europe, similar debates started when the 
EU Commission introduced a proposed amendment on copyright term extension for performers’ right 
in 2006, “Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Directive 2006/116/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the term of protection of copyright and related rights, 
COM/2008/0464 Final / COD 2008/0157. This change was made despite impact studies warning against 
such extension. e.g. The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy (2006), 
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam for DG Internal Market, Text avail-
able online <http://www.ivir.nl/ publications/other/ IViR_Recast_Final_Report_ 2006.pdf>. This is an 
independent review commissioned by the European Commission (DG Internal Market). It sparked 
criticism across Europe. See, for example, Kretschmer, M. et al. (2008) Creativity Stifled? A joint aca-
demic statement on the proposed copyright term extension for sound recordings. European Intellectual 
Property Review (EIPR) 30(9): 341-347, which was signed by leading 50 European academics. At the 
time of writing, the European Parliament voted in favor of the proposal with a modified text of 70 years’ 
term extension on the first reading and it is now at the Council of Ministers. <http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2009-0282 > [cited on 26.4.2009].
16 See for example, Yu, Peter K.,(2006) TRIPs and Its Discontents. 10 Marquette Intellectual 
Property Law Review 369, and Oddi, A. Samuel. (1996). TRIPs – Natural Rights and a “Polite Form of 
Economic Imperialism?” 29 vand. j. of transnat’l law. 425.
17 Schumpeter, Joseph A.(1942) , Capitalism, Socialism And Democracy  at  88 and 106 (Harper & 
Row, 3d ed, 1950) 
18 Kitch, Edmund W. (1977). The Nature and Function of The Patent System. 20 Journal of Law and 
Economics 265.  On the criticism, see Publication 1 in this book, at 235-237. (original pagination).
19 Arrow Kenneth J. Arrow, (1962) Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, 
in The Rate And Direction Of Inventive Activity: Economic And Social Factors 609 (Richard R. 
Nelson ed., Princeton Univ. Press).
20 Scotchmer,  Suzanne (1991) Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent 
Law, 5 J.Econ. Perspectives 29,  Merges, RP. & Richard R. Nelson, (1990) On the Complex Economics 
of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839.
21 Heller and Eisenberg, (1998), supra note 2 
22 Shapiro, supra note 2.
23 Lemley (2004), supra note 11 
24 Burk and Lemley, supra note 9, at  1577.
25 Ibid. See also Publication 1, Part II of this book.
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and access. Exclusive rights allow innovators or the producer of the knowledge 
to rely on the right to recoup the cost of investment. However, an efficient use of 
resources requires coordination of the uses of the resource or flow of such uses. 
Coordination is more crucial for the uses of intangible resources, because simul-
taneous and independent but duplicative production and use is not resolved by ex-
clusive right alone. Exclusion may provide a system of production of the resources. 
However, exclusive rights alone may fail to provide order among conflicting and 
overlapping multiple claim-holders, and governing the uses of the resources and 
manage the flow of  uses, i.e. how such uses may be coordinated, before, during and 
after the rights are claimed and granted.26 
1.3.2. Exclusion and Coordination in Intellectual Property Theories
Fundamentally, intellectual property rights grant the right-holder the right to ex-
clude others from engaging in certain types of conducts that are defined as in-
fringement in law. In regards to patents, such conduct is harmonized to a degree 
under the TRIPs agreement27 and harmonized remedies for infringement of intel-
lectual property include both injunction and damages.28 This right to exclude and 
the presence of injunctive relief characterizes the rules concerning patent right in 
particular, a property rule regime that requires permission prior to use, as opposed 
to a liability rule regime based the idea that the infringer pays a fee after the use 
and will not be enjoined from the use .29
In the tangibles, the boundary of the object of a right is mostly physically 
definable and the right-holders may show ownership by physically possessing 
the tangible object. Even in the case of a paper title being used, as in the case of 
ownership of an immovable such as land, specifying the boundary of the object 
is physically possible. In contrast, in intellectual property, the boundary of an ab-
stract object is drawn based on the action of using a legally constructed intangible 
object (invention or expression) that is not limited by the tangible boundary of the 
medium (product, process or work).30 The actual boundary is shown where one 
engages in some conduct that would require authorization from the right-holders. 
Thus, the right to exclude is specifically limited to those activities defined in law. 
Furthermore, a right to exclude can be enforced in two ways. It may be en-
forced strictly under the property rule by enjoining the trespasser from such ac-
26 Hess Charlotte and Ostrom, Elinor (2003) Ideas, Artifacts, And Facilities: Information As A Common-
Pool Resource 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 111. See also discussion in Publication 3, in this book, Part II. 
27 TRIPs agreement, supra note 10, Article 28. 
28 TRIPs agreement, supra note 10 , Article 44-45, In Europe, EC Directive 2004/48/EC Article 11 and 
Article 13. EC. O.J. L 195, 2.6.2004 p. 16–25 [Hereinafter EC Enforcement Directive], obliging member 
states to make both injunctive relief and damages available. Similarly, in the US, 35 USC §283, §284, 
however, subject to eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), and In Japan, Japanese 
Patent law, infra note 83,  §100 and §102. 
29 In the context of property, this is explained as property rules versus liability rules. See Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, (1972). Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 1089.  As applied to intellectual property right, see Reichman J. (1994) 
Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2432. 
30 See for example, Sherman Brad and Bently Lionel (1999) The Making of Modern Intellectual 
Property Law.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press at 47-50, comparing the pre-modern con-
cept to the modern concept of intangible property, as an action to an object.
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tion, thus forcing the user to enter into a license agreement with the right holder 
before every action. On the other hand, a right to exclude may be enforced under 
the liability rule by requesting the trespasser to pay a fee after such action has 
occurred. Currently, the enforcement of the intellectual property right is a mix of 
these two types of rules. 
Moreover, the right to enjoin others is sometimes subject to judicial discretion. 
For example, the text of the United States statutes provides that the courts may 
grant injunctions and the discretion of the court has been highlighted in the eBay 
decision.31 In Europe, a national patent law may incorporate different texts, but 
the text of the enforcement directive leaves room for discretion to the member 
state by informing member states that the judicial authorities may grant injunc-
tions.32 In contrast, the text of the Japanese patent law provides that the patent 
right-holder is entitled to an injunction as the right to request an injunction is 
part of the patent right and that the discretion of the court is limited.33 However, 
case laws and academic opinions suggest the possibility of using the scope and 
the object of an injunction flexibly.34 
This highlights that the right of exclusion provided by the intellectual prop-
erty law is not complete and that the rules of intellectual property are a mixture 
of property rules and liability rules. Furthermore, this indicates that it is too sim-
plistic to characterize intellectual property only from the perspective of exclusion. 
Since the object of a right is a combination of action over an abstract thing, the 
right not only excludes others from the specified abstract object, but also coordi-
nates and governs the actions of users. 
The governance or coordination perspectives are found in particular in the lit-
erature using the economic approach to property law, partly because economists 
view property right as a right governing particular uses of resources. This defi-
nition of property right has been adopted in some of the early American law and 
economics literature and they consider coordination in the discussion of prop-
erty rights governing tangibles. For example, Demsetz initially observed that the 
emergence of property rights is to internalize the external beneficial and harm-
ful effects.35 This observation implicitly connects the emergence of intellectual 
property rights to coordination controlling the uses of resources, which otherwise 
could be held in common. However, coordination is studied as a justification for 
creating property rights to internationalize the externalities of benefits and dis-
advantages over the uses of commonly held tangible resources.
Closer connection of coordination to the exclusive right of intellectual property 
arises later in the work of Kitch.36 While drawing an analogy between the mining 
31 35 USC §283, and eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, supra note 29.
32 EC Enforcement Directive, supra note 28, Article 11. 
33 Japanese Patent Law , infra note 83, §100.
34 See for example, Electrodeposited Image Case, 1764 Hanrei Jihou 112 (Tokyo D. Ct., Sept. 20, 
2001), and Tamura Yoshiyuki (2009), Tokkyohouno Riron (The Theory of Patent Law), at 335-368, 
Yuhikaku. Japan.
35 Demsetz, Harold (1967) Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 The American Economic Review 
2: 347-359.
36 Kitch, supra note  18. 
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claim and the patent system, Kitch advanced the patent prospect theory favouring 
an early grant and broader patent right over a known technological possibility and 
argued that this is because the right-holder will be in an ideal position to “to coordi-
nate the search for technological and market enhancement of the patent’s value.”37 
Landes and Posner extended this argument to copyright.38 They observe that the 
exclusive right of property over creation prevents premature exhaustion of the val-
ues generated after the creation, and proposed a system of indefinitely renewable 
copyrights.39 Other authors similarly explored the provision of property rights over 
intangible resources stating that this positively coordinated with the use of the re-
source from the standpoint of information costs. For example, focusing on the infor-
mation cost of an innovative process, Long claimed that the informational aspects 
of patent signals further research and thus coordinates the innovation process.40 
Similarly, Smith focuses on information cost and uses the concept of govern-
ance (rights of uses) versus exclusion as two alternative strategies.41 He argues 
that the modularity provided by an exclusion strategy (i.e. property rules) man-
ages coordination better than a governance strategy (i.e. liability rules), because 
it can mitigate high information costs.42 Kieff goes one step further. Coordination 
is the central thesis in Kieff.43 He connects the coordination of an individual’s ac-
tivities to the intellectual property, in the context of competition and access.44 He 
compares coordination based on intellectual property to alternative institutional 
arrangements such as market-based individual transactions (i.e. contract) with-
out a property right, norm communities, firms, government45 and claims that the 
coordination of individual actions based on these institutional arrangement in the 
absence of an intellectual property right may lead to anti-competitive effects and 
decrease downstream access – a negative type of coordination.46 
In the sense that they employed coordination as a central conceptual tool to 
analyze the institutional arrangement of intellectual property and that alternative 
institutional arrangements were compared, the above literature makes a valuable 
contribution to the discourse of intellectual property. Furthermore, the obser-
vation that intellectual property facilitates coordination may be true when the 
boundary of the property is clear and the rights are enforced.47 However, whether 
the exclusive right of intellectual property is preferable to alterative arrangements 
37 Kitch supra note 18 at 276.
38 See Landes William and Posner Richard (2003) Indefinitely Renewable Copyright 70 U Chi L.Rev 471. 
39 Landes and Posner, Ibid at 475 and 485. For a detailed discussion, see Publication 3, Part II in this 
book at 18-20 (original pagination).
40 Long, C. (2002) Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L.Rev..625.
41 Smith, Henry E. (2007) Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 
116  Yale Law Journal 1742.
42 Ibid. For a critique of using the modularity perspective, see Carrier, Michael A. (2007) Why 
Modularity Does Not (and Should Not) Explain Intellectual Property. 117 The Yale Law Journal Pocket 
Part 95.
43 Kieff, F. Scott. (2006). Coordination, Property and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to 
Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access. 56 Emory Law Journal 327 at 354-379.
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid at 354-370.
46 Ibid at 370. 
47 Lemley, Mark A. and Weiser, Phil, (2007) Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information? 
85 Texas Law Review 783.
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must be examined by empirical evidence. Additionally, none of these alternative 
arrangements studied exist entirely without the underlying exclusive rights. In 
the studied examples, the alternative governance regimes never completely sub-
stitute intellectual property but rather complement the intellectual property re-
gime as a means to adjust scope of rights. Thus the claim that intellectual property 
is preferable is not strongly supported by the evidences that they cite and their 
recommendation may not be so different from the recommendation from earlier 
law and economics property scholars advocating the creation of a strong property 
right. Ultimately, they advocate strong exclusive rights, because among others 
things, a strong exclusive would lead to a “good type of coordination.”48 
In sum, the property-centric coordination thesis boils down to two core nor-
mative recommendations. First, exclusive rights with a broader scope and injunctive 
relief coordinate the uses of the resources better than the other alternatives. Secondly, 
as a corollary, the right to coordinate multiple uses after the grant of the first right 
should be concentrated in the right-holder. In other words, they recommend existing 
rights broader in scope with a stronger form of remedy. Making existing rights 
stronger and broader is arguably one way to minimize the coordination problem 
because this will lead to relatively fewer rights and thus fewer transaction costs. 
However, it is questionable whether it would justify more rights. Furthermore, a 
property-based solution for positive coordination needs to meet the challenges of 
the observations claiming that exclusive rights cause a problem of coordination 
in certain situations – in particular, fragmentation of rights. 
1.3.3. Fragmentation Caused by Exclusion 
In contrast to the above property-centric approach, a few influential studies on 
the impact of patent grants on new subject matter, particularly biotechnology and 
software, claim that exclusion cause the fragmentation of rights. In this context, 
they imply that exclusive rights either negatively influence the coordinating use of 
resources, or at least create demands for a further governance mechanism that would 
coordinate the uses. 
Earlier, Heller claimed that where there are mutually exclusive rights over the 
same object of a property right, the core of the rights may become fragmented, 
resulting in underuse.49 Using the example of the post-Soviet store front being 
underused during the transition period, Heller claimed that many rights with a 
mutually and equally exclusive effect make it difficult to pool the fragments into a 
usable bundle and results in the underuse of resources. He termed this underuse as 
anti-commons problem. Heller and Eisenberg applied the anti-commons problem 
to biotechnology inventions in the United States.50 They claimed that the narrow 
yet mutually exclusive patent rights over upstream technology (i.e. DNA gene frag-
ments) causes problems regarding the downstream commercial innovation that 
48 Id. 435-436.
49 Heller Michael (1998), The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 Harv. L.Rev 621. See also discussion Publication 3, Part II, infra, at 20-23 (original 
Pagination.)
50 Heller and Eisenberg (1998), supra note 2. 
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has to use upstream technology since the multiple fragments of rights create accu-
mulated costs. Similarly, Shapiro claimed that not only narrow scope but broad yet 
overlapping exclusive rights subject the SW industry to a patent thickets problem.51 
Collectively, they documented that the combined impact of expansionist change 
in American patent law, leading to grants of multiple rights surrounding one tech-
nology or one innovative subject matter area, and cognitive bias in the right hold-
ers behaviours result in underuse of resources.  In particular, this discouraged 
alternative institutions from emerging to govern problem of fragmentation.52 
Broader and strong exclusions have been questioned earlier in the works of 
Scotchmer,53 Mazzoleni and Nelson54 and Nelson and Merges.55 In particular, 
Shapiro, in a similar context, argued that even in the case of fewer and broader 
patents, when they overlap in one or a similar technological area, right-holders 
need to license from each other, clearing the overlapping area of technology.56 
This thicket of permissions may lead to the underuse of technology and unless a 
collective solution to manage the thicket emerges, exclusive right may lead to an 
underuse of the innovation. Thus, under these conditions, the exclusive right of 
patent is seen to hinder rather than promote innovation. 
In particular, the concept of anti-commons that describes the negative im-
pact on coordination caused by property rights has spurred much follow-on lit-
erature, both in law and economics. Additionally, anti-commons, as a “tragedy” 
of the under-utilization of resources caused by a rational choice, has stimulated 
empirical studies, regardless of whether the problem can be empirically veri-
fied or falsified.57 In the United States property literature, anti-commons spurred 
semi-commons thesis to complete the spectrum of perspectives from commons, 
anti-commons, semi-commons and the private for property rights.58 In particular, 
Smith develops the semi-commons theory including a mix of private rights and 
commons, which illustrates the case of intangible resources under current intel-
lectual property protection.59 
51 Shapiro (2001), supra note 2. See also Burk and Lemley (2003) supra note 9 at 1610-1615, that 
anti-commons and patent thickets are two of the problems cause by intellectual property due to 
complementarity problems.
52 Heller and Eisenberg (1998) supra note 2.
53 Scotchmer (1991), supra note 20.
54 Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998), supra note 9.
55 Merges and Nelson (1990), supra note 20.
56 Shapiro (2001), supra note 2.
57 See for example, Walsh, Arora and Cohen (2003), Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and 
Biomedical Innovation, IN W.M. Cohen and S. Merrill, eds. Patents in the Knowledge Based Economy. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press at 285340. 
58 See Smith, Henry E. (2000) Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields. 29 
Journal of Legal Studies 131-169, introducing the concept of semicommons, and Loren, Lydia 
Pallas (2007)  Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative Commons 
Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright. 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 271 (2007), applying the 
concept of semicommons to describe the creative commons project. Creative commons is a project 
that drafts and recommends a set of standardized copyright licensing terms, with a view to create 
relatively open norms for sharing the copyrighted works. The work was pioneered in the US, with 
Lawrence Lessig as a key person. See http://creativecommons.org/ for more information and see 
evaluation of Elkin-Koren, Niva (2005) What Contracts Can’t Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in 
Facilitating a Creative Commons. 74 Fordham L. Rev. 375.
59 Smith, (2000), supra note 58.
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1.3.4. Theoretical Position of this Research 
As reviewed above, there are growing literatures on the impact of exclusive rights 
on coordination, both in legal and economic research. However, the recommenda-
tions seem to be divided along the normative position on whether the exclusive 
right of intellectual property is beneficial or harmful to coordination and who 
or which institution is at the best position to promote or regulate coordination. 
Scholars seem to agree on the point that the rights and uses surrounding a speci-
fiable intangible resource or technological prospect are increasingly becoming 
fragmented and that they require a governing mechanism for coordination. The 
disagreement seems be on the causes and solution to the fragmentation and how 
and if the intellectual property rights should be or can be calibrated in the face 
of fragmentation.
The division in normative positions may be partially due to the gap in law and 
practice. Innovation is a heterogeneous and multi-faceted process. As a continu-
ous process, innovation is dynamic and the relationship surrounding and gener-
ated by this process is fluid, flexible and often complex. In contrast, when intel-
lectual property is framed as a property, it is inevitably compared to the institution 
of property rights over tangibles based on the binary relationship between an 
object and the corresponding right, where the boundary of the right is physically 
clear. In intellectual property, especially in the context of patent, even where the 
rights are registered and based on a paper title, the scope of the object is never 
clear, until disputed and specified by the court. Viewed through the lens of prop-
erty, intellectual property in the innovation process may be viewed as part of the 
available resources to be used, controlled and appropriated, while in fact it could 
very well be an action and a process. In short, both academically and practically, 
a substantial gap exists between perspectives on the production, use and transac-
tion of innovation and the production, use and transaction of intellectual property. 
In the context of patent, fragmentation resulting from multiple sources, multi-
ple claim-holders and multiple uses seems to be one indication of the discrepancy 
between the binary model of innovation used in law and the actual underlying 
process of invention and creation. If an invention is derived from the action of a 
single actor, a so-called stand-alone invention, then it is plausible to coordinate 
uses of many others by concentrating the right to control all forms of uses to the 
single actor. This may also be easily justified because the invention could not exist 
without the input of the single actor. However, in practice, sources of an invention 
are plural and many actors may create the inventive concepts in no particular 
order, or may even use the same inventive concept simultaneously. Unless an 
invention is so unique and pioneering, it is natural that the initial entitlement 
to apply for a patent is fragmented, as there will be multiple claim-holders and 
contributors. After the grant of a right, an invention may be simultaneously used 
by the many with no particular physical spatial order or limitation. Thus, multiple 
uses of an invention after the grant of patent may fragment a right.  
Previous research considers coordination by highlighting it in regard to post-
grant coordination of multiple uses, including those of after-arising technologies 
24
and improvements. However, as argued above, fragmentation in patent may be 
observed in other contexts as well, because multiple actors may participate in all 
stages of innovation, not simply in the use of the granted rights and inventions. In 
particular, there are at least three further types of fragmentation that may be ob-
served in the context of patent, in which exclusive right as such does not provide 
positive coordination: (1) fragmentation in the entitlement prior to the grant of right 
(2) fragmentation of the rights after the grant of right, (3) geographical fragmenta-
tion of the right during enforcement. They need to be discussed in the context of 
coordination and exclusive right and this research will explore them.
(1)  Fragmentation to the entitlement prior to the grant of right60 
Innovation is becoming an increasingly open and collaborative process.61 Even 
when firms engage in closed and in-house R&D, they may employ multiple re-
searchers to participate in the project. When multiple actors participate in the proc-
ess of innovation, the right to file for the patent itself could be fragmented. Thus 
even before the patent right is granted, there will be questions as to who has the 
right to file for patent concerning the innovation. The contribution of each party 
may vary in terms of its quality (i.e. financial input or mental inputs) and quantity. 
The fragmentation in the entitlement calls for coordination before the grant 
of right, among the collaborators about who would file and manage the patent 
application as well as during the prosecution and enforcement of the right. This 
is because fragmentation in the entitlement for the patent often results in either 
joint proprietorship among the parties (joint inventorship, co-ownership) who 
collaborated or the sole right of the right-holder who manages the patent.62  When 
only exclusion is emphasized, the interests of an inventor to use his own contri-
bution to that invention may be ignored. When claimed as joint proprietorship, a 
strong exclusive right held by each joint owner fragments the right to the extent 
that assertion of the right against the third party may be prevented. 
(2) Fragmentation of rights, post grant63
In earlier works on property rights, authors have used the metaphor of a bundle 
of rights to correctly describe the various aspects of rights and interests that are 
protected and regulated as property right under the law.64 A similar description is 
also possible for intellectual property. The core of a patent right, for example, is 
the right to exclude others from engaging in certain types of activities, and thus it 
is possible to describe it as a bundle of exclusive rights. The right can be divided 
according to the particular uses that require authorization from the right-holder 
60 See, Publication 5, Part II infra.
61 Chesbrough, Henry (2003) Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting 
from Technology, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
62 See, Publication 5, Part II infra  at 82-83 (Original Pagination).
63 See, Publication 2 and Publication 3, Part II, infra.
64 For example, see the discussion in the US, Ellickson Robert C., Rose Carole M., and Ackerman 
Bruce A. ed. (1995). Perspectives on Property Law. Second Edition. Boston New York: Little Brown 
and Company; for the discussion of other metaphors, see Rose, Carol M. (1994) Property and 
Persuasion. Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of Ownership. Westview Press: Boulder.
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and thus, the right-holders may exercise their right by licensing particular frag-
ments of uses. Field of use licenses are typical examples. As in the property right 
to tangibles, intellectual property rights may become subject to fragmentation. 
Such fragmentation has often been studied in the context of competition or anti-
trust law in particular, whether such fragmented licensing is pro-competitive or 
anti-competitive.65
In addition to this, after the grant of the right, fragmentation can exist in the 
form of concurring multiple rights held by multiple right-holders over a single core 
“object”. This type of fragmentation is a direct result of the expansionist legal 
change involving new subjects of patent (i.e. software and biotechnology). Earlier 
literature sometimes discussed this as a problem of blocking or dependent pat-
ents (i.e. a right that overlaps in scope that cannot be used without permission 
of another right-holder).66 However, when the scope of enquiry is expanded to a 
downstream product, it may be possible to see fragmentation that is not present 
in a single patented invention but in the cluster of patents covering a complex 
systems technology or a group of solutions and tools geared for a downstream 
product. An innovation in the product market, in this context, requires coordinat-
ing the fragments of rights or a clearance. Furthermore, to compete in the market 
for a complete product, firms need to coordinate the multiple fragmented uses. As 
reviewed above, the problem of anti-commons or patent thickets is a coordination 
problem due to concurrence of rights.67
(3)  Geographical Fragmentation of Patents68
Geographic fragmentation is both factual and legal. A right may become frag-
mented as there is no uniform intellectual property law that has a universal effect. 
All rights are still national in origin and thus territorial in effect. Right-holders 
need to appropriate and enforce rights nationally. Multiple rights may be held in 
parallel by one right-holder, based on one invention. Fragmentation is a direct 
result of the territoriality principles of law and patent right and thus, the solution 
is seen to be more procedurally oriented.   
Additionally, a right may become geographically fragmented by facts, when a 
right is readily divisible into different uses and can substantively be practiced in 
modules. As discussed above, an intellectual property right encompasses bun-
dles of uses that may be decomposed into various actions.  When certain action 
is regulated in one country as infringement, but not in others, the right and its 
enforcement may be fragmented geographically. 
65 See, for example, Patterson, Mark R. (2008) The competitive effects of patent field-of-use licenses 
IN, Drexl, Josef. ed. (2008) Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, at 162-200.
66 See, Merges and Nelson (1990), supra note 20.
67 See text accompanying supra note 49 to 57. 
68 See Publication 4, Part II, infra.
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Figure 1. Distributed Act of Use and Geographical Fragmentation of a Right.
As Figure 1 illustrates in the context of a patent, the right-holder of a complete set 
of claims may yet choose to use the invention in a modular manner. A firm may 
typically produce a product that embodies the invention by manufacturing parts 
and components of that invention and ship them abroad to be combined. Firms 
often do this to exploit production factors such as labor and logistical costs for the 
distribution of the finished products. However, as the right of exclusion can be 
decomposed into different uses, shipping or exporting components may be regu-
lated differently from the distribution or sale of a complete product. 
Another example of the substantive geographical fragmentation of a right is 
so-called distributed claiming. Because the patent system is based on the textual 
description of functional subject matter, the text of the claims requires interpre-
tation to enforce the right, in terms of the infringing technology.69 However, in 
Internet-related inventions, patent claims may adopt the multiple perspectives of 
the users and be drafted in a distributed manner, as Figure 2 below illustrates. 
In such a case, if the invention is in the combination, the final complete set of 
claims may be used by the end-user, and not the intermediaries who may provide 
an instrumental device or services for such use. In these contexts, the rights are 
geographically fragmented and the actors who coordinate the actions and uses of 
the invention and the right-holder are not necessarily the same. 
69 Lee, Nari (2000) Technological Change and Regulatory Heterogeneity. Vaasa: Research Papers. 
Proceedings of the University of Vaasa  at 67-144.
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Figure 2. Distributed Claims of a Patent and Geographical Fragmentation.
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this research is to bridge the gap in research by focusing on the 
aspects of fragmentation that have previously been under-researched and by re-
examining the means of coordinating the fragmentation. In particular, the essays 
collected in this study together question if the exclusive right of patent promotes or 
hinders coordination of fragmentation and, if so, what are the alternative institutional 
arrangements for coordination. 
The essays examine the fragmentation of the rights and use caused by grants 
of exclusive rights on new subject matter, in particular – modern information 
processing and computer program technology. They explore the impact of pat-
ent right on the innovation of these technologies and the impact of exclusion on 
coordination in the innovation process. Collectively, they aim to challenge the 
binary model of knowledge production and right, and explore the implication of 
coordination and fragmentation, in patent theories. In particular, they explore a 
pluralistic patent theory reflecting multiple focal points in the construction of the 
right, actors and institutional choices. 
The essays focus in part ICT industry and computer program inventions. 
Coordination in the ICT industry is deemed to be of greater necessity because 
most of the today’s end-user informational processing products are so-called 
complex systems products. In other words, a product often consists of various 
parts and modules that are independent products while at the same time gener-
ating synergistic commercial values as a system. Product complexity also means 
that the relationship governing one product and the entitlements related to it 
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becomes fragmented. Fragmentation makes the coordination of titles and rights 
essential, not only just for a specific process of product development, but also 
for overall innovation in the industry. Coordination to integrate the fragmented 
rights may have positive effect beyond the negative type of coordination with 
monopolistic inclination or may even be a necessary condition to compete in the 
complex systems product market. 
Additionally, firms may manage the complexity of production modularly - 
by disintegrating some of its facilities in a modular way, to gain efficiency and 
outsource production, sometimes to multiple jurisdictions. Modular production 
means innovative technologies may be produced or used partially, and not in their 
entirety, and often under different legal settings and institutional arrangements. 
Further innovation may occur as a combination of one part of the product with 
that of others and in some cases innovative combination may be accomplished by 
the final end-users of the modules or system products.70 
The above considerations imply plurality of actors and institutional arrange-
ments. Thus the study aims to connect the exclusion provided by intellectual prop-
erty, namely patent right, to the coordination of resources, and reviews various 
institutional arrangements surrounding patent rights, in order to overcome frag-
mentation. This study claims that when fragmentation is caused by changes in law 
that create additional right-holders, efficiency gains in the coordination by having 
a property right over that particular subject matter may be lost. Furthermore, by 
employing a multi-institutional perspective,71 the study emphasizes that all insti-
tutions with coordination processes that clarify the fuzzy boundaries of rights, 
pool fragments and provide a governing hierarchy need to be considered in the 
proposals for solutions. In this context, the research argues that focusing only 
one means of promoting coordination may fail to correctly assess the alternative 
institutional arrangements.  
The study aims to bring a pluralistic and process-oriented perspective to the 
theories of intellectual property and, in particular, to the discussion of patent 
right. The intangible knowledge that the right represents is non-rival in nature, 
and can be used simultaneously by many without reducing the value of each use. 
Patent right does not necessarily have a correlating binary subject matter of pro-
tection or a subject matter of use. For example, licensing of patent or copyrighted 
material presupposes that the scope of authorization is clear, and the relationship 
of the licensor and the licensee is clearly understood, analogous to that of buyer 
and seller of tangible goods.  However, in the context of intangible innovation, a 
right does not necessarily cover a single discrete market product and function 
70 See Strandburg, Katherine J. (2008) Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 467.
71 See Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, Antonina (2007) Copyright from an institutional perspective : Actors, 
itnersts, stakes and the logic of participation. 4 Review of Economic research on Copyright Issues 65; 
Rai, Arti (2003) Engaging facts and policy: a multi-institutional approach to patent system reform . 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 1035, at 1039, highlighting the need to engage in comparative institutional analysis.; 
Tamura, Yoshiyuki (2008) Towards the New Paradigm of Intellectual Property Law. The Law and Policy 
of Intellectual Property: Building a new framework, 20 Intellectual Property Law and Policy Journal 
1 (in Japanese, unpublished English translation on file with the author.) 
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as a single input to the final product.72 Attributing intangible inputs to concrete 
outputs in information goods is extremely difficult.73 As economists explain, in-
tangible resources may be produced by multiple actors and used by multiple ac-
tors. Underlying knowledge governed partially by intellectual property may be 
produced by multiple actors and used as inputs into multi-component products or 
intermediate products. Furthermore, the difficulty of attribution is due to the very 
abstractness or intangibleness of the subject matter that the intellectual property 
right is based on. The binary relationship of an object and the exclusive right 
does not exist in the intellectual property right and the relationship between an 
“abstract object” and exclusive right is almost purely legal convention. Thus the 
attribution of the inputs to the output must also be based on legal convention.
Legal convention, in many senses, does not apply to the actual transaction 
of useful or creative knowledge and the expression. Trading of useful knowl-
edge and creative expression requires communication beyond the transaction of 
formalized title to the property against payment. Binary transaction may be ap-
plicable when the goal of transaction is just for the sake of gaining the necessary 
permission to use a well-defined knowledge to avoid litigation. However, when 
the exchange is to learn and use the innovation, this assumption may collapse 
because the exchange has to be less transactional and more relational and con-
tinuous. This is because the knowledge specified and clearly governed by a right 
may often be insufficient to commercialize the innovation and the tacit knowledge 
transfer must be separately agreed, with or without the exclusive property rights. 
In this context, the study aims to highlight the contradiction between legal conven-
tion and the actual practice of knowledge exchange.
1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.5.1. Review of Jurisprudential Methodologies
The discussion of the research methodology in jurisprudence has various strands. 
A strict categorization of methodology for a general theory may not be as useful 
in intellectual property theory. However, it is still possible to broadly distinguish 
legal theories based on methods that are used in terms of the selection and treat-
ment of sources and conceptual tools and the purposes of such selections and 
apply it to this research.
Debates on general legal research methods distinguish methods of legal re-
search as analytical, ethical and sociological.74 Further categorization may yield 
such general divisions as interpretative, conceptual analysis, empirical analysis, 
and normative advocacy. Generally, a survey of the debates on the methodology of 
legal theory leads to a division into two large category of methodology – descrip-
72 See, for example, Ullrich, Hanns (2008) Patent pools - policy and problems. IN: Drexl ed. (2008), 
supra  note  65: 138-161, at 143. 
73 For an excellent account of an abstract object in the history of English patent law, seec Sherman 
and Bently (1999), supra note 30.
74 Stone, Julius (1956) The Province and Function of Law, Harvard University Press.  
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tive and analytical methods.75 In general, it is believed that the purpose of using 
descriptive methodology is to find a descriptive criterion to find and better under-
stand “the law” among its many sources. Descriptive methodology often viewed as 
having a theoretical penchant for legal positivism, for its reliance on authoritative 
sources, in Dworkin’s terminology “rules”.76 In contrast, the analytical method is 
used to build a theory for a normative argument. Because this method is used as a 
means of building an internal and interpretative analysis, relying on moral rules 
or standards, it is often associated with normative theories.77 
There are countless books and articles on the debates defending each position 
as the proper methodology of jurisprudence, and this study will not recount these 
debates.78 However, these methodology debates in legal research are tied to the 
philosophical debates on the nature of law and authority, and they seem to indicate 
that the choice of a methodology may have meaning beyond the simple organization 
of the sources, and materials, but also the methodology may implicate substances of 
the research.79 In intellectual property, the selection of the methodology may thus 
mean a differing stance on the philosophical justification of the right and limita-
tions to such rights.80
 Furthermore, at close inspection, the boundaries of methodologies are quite 
often fuzzy and interlinked, and most legal research unavoidably adopts both 
descriptive and analytical methods. Conceptual analysis based on descriptive ju-
risprudence is necessary to emulate and justify normative changes.81 Similarly, 
to a certain extent, most legal research utilizes all these methodologies - concep-
tual analysis, normative advocacy, interpretive and to an extent limited empirical 
analysis based on disputed cases and practices. 
75 Compare the debates between Dworkin and Hart on descriptive and analytical jurisprudence, 
Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking rights seriously,  Harvard University Press, and  Dworkin, Ronald 
(1986) Law’s Empire, Harvard University Press, and  Hart, H.L.A. (1961) The Concept of Law. 
Claredonen - Oxford University Press. 2nd Edition with Postscript (1994), edited by Bullock, P.A. 
and Raz J. 
76 Dworkin, Ronald (1977) supra note 75 at 17-22, describing and criticizing the legal positivism of 
Austin and Hart. For a review of positivist legal theory in Europe, see Spaak, Torben (2003) Legal 
Positivism, Law’s Normativity and the Normative Force of Legal Justification. 16 Ratio Juris 469 at 
471-472. 
77 Dworkin, Ronald (1977) supra note at 22-31.
78 See, for  example, the follow-up and characterization of the debates, See Leiter, Brian (2003) 
Beyond the Hart/ Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 American Journal 
of Jurisprudence 17,  Raz, Joseph (1985) Authority, Law, and Morality, 68 The Monist 295 and Finnis, 
John (2000) On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism, 75 Notre Dame Law Review 1611. For a review of 
positivist legal theory in Europe, see Spaak, Torben (2003) Legal Positivism, Law’s Normativity and 
the Normative Force of Legal Justification. 16 Ratio Juris 469 at 471-472.  See also Halpin, Andrew 
(2006) The Methodology of Jurisprudence: Thirty Years Off the Point. 19 Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence, 67-105.
79 See Ratner Steven R, and Slaughter Anne-Marie (1999) The Method is the Message. 93 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 410. 
80 See Drahos, Peter (1996) A Philosophy of Intellectual Property. Dartmouth. 
81 For example, Dickson tries to offer a path between descriptive or normative methodology. Spaak 
argues that legal positivist can accept morality. Dickson J, (2004) Methodology in Jurisprudence: A 
Critical Survey. 10 Legal Theory 117. Spaak (2003), supra note 78. Similarly, Coleman’s pragmatic 
conceptualism is a modification of positivism by using conceptual analysis in core legal concepts. 
Coleman (2001) , supra note 12. 
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1.5.2. Research Methodology of this Study
The methodology employed in the essays in this study involves conceptual analy-
sis, interpretative dimension and normative advocacy across jurisdictions, and 
levels of ordering – both private and public ordering. This is inevitable for legal 
research in a global context.82 While a systematic empirical analysis is not adopted 
as a method in this study, the practices in cases of dispute and patent examina-
tion practices as well as private ordering provide a limited glimpse into what an 
empirical study may reveal. 
In the descriptive part of the research, the study uses the primary sources of 
law. Primary sources including statutes and case laws that have authority over pat-
ent right as well as administrative examination guidelines of the patent offices have 
been selected and studied in two jurisdictions of Japan83 and the United States84 and 
to a certain extent in Europe, by focusing on the European Patent Convention85and 
decisions of board of appeal at European Patent Office (EPO). Wherever relevant, 
primary sources in specific national jurisdictions in Europe have been selectively 
studied. International conventions that are related to the grant and assertion of 
patent rights, in particular the TRIPs agreement, are also reviewed.86 
The secondary sources have been selected from multiple disciplines, includ-
ing commentaries of law, economics and organizational research. This is because 
legal commentaries alone, either descriptive or interpretative, may offer little in-
formation on how fragmentation of rights may be coordinated. Fragmentation is 
a factually interdisciplinary phenomenon, caused or exacerbated by law or legal 
change, and demands organizational inputs from economic actors. Thus, one part 
of this study complements the knowledge of patent law with process-oriented 
insights from the organizational study of firm – a capability perspective.87 An ef-
ficient use of intangible resources requires coordination of not only individuals 
with claims or entitlement to the resources but also coordination governing the 
measurement of use and how to manage the flow of intangible resources. Thus, 
not only the claim or right-holders of the resources, but also the act of measuring 
the intangible resources needs to be coordinated. The exchange of intangible in-
novation is multi-faceted and iterative and thus often requires a continuous proc-
ess of coordination beyond the exchange of title and permission for specified use 
that is covered by intellectual property right. Utilizing the capability perspective, 
the study aims to include the process-oriented perspective in patent theories. 
82 See Twining William (2005) Have Concept, Will Travel: analytical jurisprudence in a global context. 
1 Int’l J.  of law in Context 5 at 33-34.
83  Patent Law of Japan, (1959) , as amended. 
84  United States Code Title 35, as revised. 
85  Convention On The Grant Of European Patents (2000). [European Patent Convention, hereinafter 
EPC] as revised.
86 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 10.
87 See for example, Williamson, Oliver E. (1999) Strategy Research: Governance and Competence 
Perspectives, 20 Strategic Management Journal 1087-1108; Lee, Nari (2008) From Tangibles 
to Intangibles – Contracting Capabilities for Intangible Innovations,  IN: Corporate Contracting 
Capabilities (2008) edited by Soili Nystén-Haarala, University of Joensuu Publication, No.21.
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In the analytical part of the study, the research seeks to go beyond the simple 
description and comparison of primary sources in a global context.88  The study 
does not simply compare specific rules in the statutes, but approaches fragmenta-
tion as a phenomenon resulting from the grant of exclusive right in the form of 
patent, and reviews various levels of ordering that coordinate the fragmentation 
in alternative institutions in peer positions, in global context. While the descrip-
tive part of each essay identifies relevant legal doctrines and compares the dif-
ferences, the overall goal of the research is to compare alternative institutional 
arrangements to promote positive coordination. 
Institutional choice theory instructs us to engage in comparative institutional 
analysis (or multiple institutional comparison) when formulating a new policy 
or law. Based on the strong observation that “what law is, can be, or ought to be 
is determined by the character of those institutions that make, interpret, and 
enforce law,”89 Komesar proposes a framework for an institutional design focus-
ing on participation cost. This comparative institutional insight is crucial in the 
articulation of laws and policies of intellectual property right. Consequently, the 
intellectual property “system”, as a property institution, operates with multiple 
interdependent social institutions.  For example, a patent right has an interde-
pendent mixture of institutions that define, grant, evaluate and enforce the rights. 
Most countries that have a patent system now grant the patent right based on sub-
stantive examination, a process initiated by the claimant. After the grant, as long 
as the right-holder pays the fee, the nation-state maintains the right against the 
world, exercising the sovereign power of the executive branch. Right-holders 
privately enforce the rights, ultimately in the court, according to the rules laid 
down by the legislative branch of government.
Scholars have already identified the four types of institutions and actors that 
are in a peer position in the sense that they may be alternative forms of arrange-
ment – the legislative and legislator, the administrative and the government, 
the judiciary and the court and the market and private actors.90 Each institu-
tion that operates the patent system has important and separate functions, but 
at the same time they are closely interdependent.91 The legislative shapes the 
context and frame for the interactions of all the institutions and private persons. 
Administrative agencies such as the patent office and competition authorities 
function to examine and maintain the “quality” of the patent system so that in-
dividual right claims are valid before the grant and granted rights do not un-
reasonably harm competition. In contrast, the judiciary and the court often are 
dispute-based and thus selected only after the rights are granted. Thus, the court 
can only function as an institution on ex post considerations either to perform 
judicial review over the administrative action or to validate or repudiate claims 
88 Van Hoecke, Mark and Warrington, Mark (1998)  Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms And Legal 
Doctrine: Towards A New Model For Comparative Law, 47 Int’l & Comp. L. Quarterly 195.
89 Komesar, Neil (2001) Law’s limits- the rule of law and the supply and demand of rights. 
Cambridge University Press at 3.
90 Tamura  (2008), supra note 71,  Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt (2007), supra note 71.
91 Rai, Arti (2003), supra note 71 at 1039, highlighting the need to engage in comparative institutional 
analysis.
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of private claim-holders. Finally, there are private individuals who operate in the 
market, producing, exchanging and using technologies and rights. 
The task of analytical jurisprudence in a global context is thought to be en-
gagement in jurisprudential enquiry dealing with generalization across juris-
dictions.92 In this context, institutional comparison is a useful tool because the 
comparison in itself does not give any normative advice, but only suggests which 
alternative may be less imperfect, based on institutional competences.93 This does 
not mean that institutional choice would be context-independent and cannot give 
any normative advice. 94 Often the context in which an institutional choice is made 
is important in offering normative advice from the comparison, and such a context 
may be provided by adopting a historical perspective, and by highlighting the 
path dependency of a particular institutional arrangement.95 
The usefulness of this institutional comparison in the context of patent right 
is evidenced by a budding literature of patent system reforms using multi-insti-
tutional analysis, both at the national and international levels. Tamura’s thesis 
of a functional approach to the intellectual property system is an example.96 He 
stresses the importance of the division of competence according to the role and 
functions of the four institutions, emphasizing the specialist role of the patent of-
fices and suggests the policy decisions to be made by each competent institution, 
in Japan.97 Similarly, the scholars such as Rai, who employ multi-institutional 
comparison in the discussion of patent system reform, emphasize the need to 
examine the administrative agency’s role in the patent rule comparing it to the 
role of specialized courts with centralized jurisdictional competences.98 Dreyfuss 
goes on to apply multi-institutional analysis at the global level and reformulates 
the global IP law, making it a case of administrative law reform.99   
92 See generally Twining, (2005), supra note 82. 
93 See Komesar, Neil K. (1994) Imperfect Alternatives – Choosing Institutions in Law, economics 
and public policy. The University of Chicago Press. 
94 See Dworkin, (1977), supra note 75 at ix. See also Publication 1, Part II of this book at 223. (Original 
Pagination). This is addressed in Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt (2007), supra note 71 at 71, warning against 
an “abstract and ahistorical” application of the institutional choice perspective alone, which  gives 
“unrealistic normative advice.” 
95 See North, Douglass. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. 
New York : Cambridge University Press, See also Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt’s application of North, 
Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt (2007) supra note 71
96 Tamura, (2008), supra note  71.
97 Ibid. 
98 See Rai, supra note 71. After the exercise of multi-institutional comparisons in the US, she high-
lights the role of an administrative agency, but given the current context, recommends judiciary-
based reform. However, she later, with Benjamin, proposes the creation of an executive branch entity 
to oversee innovation policy in the US. See Benjamin Stuart Minor and Arti K. Rai. (2008) Fixing 
Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, Duke Law School Research Paper Series 218, Electronic 
copy available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259850.> [last visited on 10, January 2009]. See also 
Benjamin, Stuart Minor and Rai, Arti K. (2006), Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can 
Learn from Administrative Law. 95 Geo. L.J. 269, proposing a theory of applying administrative law 
principles to the patent system. 
99 Dreyfuss, Rochelle Cooper. (2008) Fostering Dynamic Innovation, Development and Trade: 
Intellectual Property as a Case Study in Global Administrative Law,  IILJ Working Paper 2008/4,(Global 
Administrative Law Series) Electronic copy available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1316925>, [last 
visited on 10, January 2009]. 
34
In Europe, the institutional structure is more complex as it has to consist of 
four institutions in each EU member state plus the European institutions. At the 
same time, in the area of patent, there is a specialized administrative agency 
which is an intergovernmental organization – the European Patent Office (EPO). 
As such, the EPO is an administrative agency based on the exercise of each con-
tracting state’s executive power but subject to no national or supra-national re-
view.100 Commentaries on the EPO reform, which started to surface as a result of 
the interaction between the EU Directive and the EPO’s administrative decisions, 
focus on these additional layers of institutional choices and their interaction.101 In 
contrast to this, competition policy regulating the exercise of intellectual property 
has been harmonized through the implementation of now Articles 101 and 102 of 
Treaty on European Union.102
Thus, the essays collected in this book approach coordination and fragmenta-
tion in part through institutional choices theory, by examining solutions in patent 
law, court based litigation, administrative solutions as well as private ordering. Law 
and legislation may be revised so that the exclusive rights granted may be recali-
brated. In turn, courts may coordinate the fragmented right in a particular context. 
Additionally, private parties may be encouraged to engage in private ordering in 
varying degree of formality in the market as well as instituting an internal process 
to manage fragmentation. Administrative agencies, such as competition authorities 
after the rights are granted and to a lesser degree the patent office in the initial 
grant of rights and as a depository of patent information, may also be involved in 
the coordination. 
100 See EPO Decision (2008) G 0002/06 at 13-17, reiterating this principle. 
101 An exemplary study discussing the layers of institutions in European patent law-making is 
Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, Antonina (Forthcoming) Jurisdictional and Institutional Aspects of Stem 
Cell Patenting in Europe (EC and EPO), In: P. Torremans and A. Plomer (eds.) Embryonic Stem Cell 
Patents: European Patent Law and Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, [on file with the author].
102 Treaty on European Union, Official Journal C115 of 9 May 2008, amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
Official Journal C306 of 17 December 2007.  Ex Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community[hereinafter EC treaty], Official Journal C 325 of 24 December 2002,  On the 
complex relation of IP law and competition policy in Europe, see Drexl, Josef, (2008) Is there a more 
economic approach to IP and competition law,  IN: Drexl (2008), supra note 65,  at 27-53.
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2. Overview of 
Publications
This dissertation consists of five publications assessing different institutional so-
lutions to the problem of fragmentation in uses and in patent rights. The publica-
tions included in this study are selected and arranged to show the research proc-
ess and how coordination has developed as the organizing concept. The essays 
discuss different aspects of patent rights where different institutions are called 
upon to present solutions to the problem of coordination and fragmentation. They 
critically review the role of exclusive right of patent and institutional arrangement 
to coordinate the use of intangible resources and overcome fragmentation. In 
cases where the topics of the essays are closely related, the scope and the direction 
are different, thus complementing each other.
The first publication provides a general theoretical framework for the entire 
study. Publications 2, 3 and 4, are a more detailed analysis of the problem of 
fragmentation in the use and enforcement of patent rights, as post-grant consid-
erations, in particular related to standardized ICT. The last publication returns 
the focus of the coordination question to the pre-grant - before or during the col-
laborative innovation process. It also opens the scope of enquiry to include firm-
internal organizational processes as one institutional arrangement. 
The essays in part utilize institutional comparisons. Publication 1 utilizes 
analytical legal theory and partially assesses the singular institutional charac-
terization of patent law as an institution of property that provides for exclusive 
rights. This may only partially explain the system of patent and lead to different 
and somewhat predictable normative advice.  Publication 2, which explores the 
relationship between standardization and patent as an exclusive right of property, 
surveys practices and connects the private ordering to patent law. Thus it partially 
compares private ordering and legislation. Publication 3 carries the theme further 
by presenting the anti-commons problem as fragmentation, which was, in the 
absence of private ordering, created by the grant of patent right as equally exclu-
sive over an identified technological area. Publication 3 utilizes analytical legal 
theory and compares the solutions in law, private ordering, and administrative 
institutions. Publication 4 examines a case where the invention can be practiced 
in fragments, and used in fragments. Coordination in this case is performed by 
the judiciary as this creates the need for courts in different jurisdictions to co-
ordinate the different uses doctrinally.  Publication 5 examines the case where 
fragmentation exists in the claims for a patent grant – joint and collaborative in-
novation, where coordination may occur predominantly through private ordering 
– commercial contracting. It indirectly compares the solutions and uncertainties 
36
in law to the contract-based solution as an alternative institutional arrangement 
to overcome the problem of fragmentation.
2.1. TOWARD A PLURALISTIC THEORY ON EFFICACIOUS PATENT 
INSTITUTION
2.1.1. Overall Objectives of the Publication 1 
This publication aims to present the theoretical position of the entire research by 
highlighting the division in the normative position on the nature of patent right in 
patent theories.  The essay examines the efficacy of the patent law as an institu-
tion of exclusive rights and reviews theories focusing on the efficiency of patent 
law. This essay explores the predominant research methodologies in patent theory 
that seek a justification for granting exclusive rights from efficiency and starts 
by questioning the utility of this enquiry. Additionally, the essay seeks to place 
patent law and its institutions into a larger context. It argues that patent law itself 
is a socially constructed institution embedded with values, objectives and goals 
and that the institutions of patent right may be legal, including law, courts and 
administrative agencies but also interact with other institutions, such as market, 
firm and informal norms. As such, the efficacy of patent institutions cannot be 
based on the singular instance of efficiency.
This essay reviews several definitions of efficiency adopted in patent theories 
in both law and economics, and characterizes them largely into two categories 
– the proprietarian or property-centric theory and the instrumentalist, or policy-
oriented, theory of patent law, and reviews how the efficacy of patent law from 
these positions are approached differently. This paper claims that proprietarian 
or property-centric theory relies greatly on a natural-rights-based justification for 
patent right. The basis of this argument is the view that the entitlement for patent 
right or intellectual property right precedes the recognition of such rights in law, 
as is the case for property right.103 Therefore the legislation acknowledges the 
right by enacting statutes granting such rights. This is either based on Lockean 
labor property theory,104 or reward theory. In this context, the law and right of 
patent has primary value, and efficiency in providing the right to exclude may 
become the goal of the institution.
In contrast, policy-oriented or instrumentalist theory characterizes patent law 
as utilitarian and instrumentalist legislation. Thus the rights are first created 
through legislation, and the grant of such rights serves specifically defined social 
policy goals. This right is closer to what Hohfeld classified as a privilege that may 
be revoked when certain conditions of grant, i.e. “duties”, are not met.105 It is thus 
103 Hohfeldian classifications of rights and obligation are useful here. Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb 
(1913) Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L. J. 16 .
104 See Locke John, (1690) The Second Treatize Of Government, ch. 5, (1690), available at <http://
www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext05/trgov10.txt>.  See also commentaries in Publication 1, Part II, at 
230-235 (original pagination).
105 Hohfeld, (1913) , supra note at 30 .
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possible to view patent as a legally created monopoly whose use and abuse may be 
subject to the scrutiny of public authorities, or as a legally constructed incentive 
that supports market-based incentives for innovation and creation. 
2.1.2. Findings and Main Contribution 
This essay builds on the perspective that denies the existence of a uniform set 
of norms underlying patent institutions and finds no single theory focusing on 
efficiency to be generally applicable to the system of patent, either claiming or 
disclaiming the efficacy of the patent law over other institutional alternatives. The 
main contribution of this article to the theory of patent law is to point out that this 
absence is not an indication of the failure of jurisprudential efforts, but caused 
rather by the fact that a uniform efficiency applicable to the entire institution of 
patent law cannot be defined. 
The essay concludes that a singular assessment of the patent institution is 
nearly impossible and suggests that the multi-faceted nature of the patent insti-
tution calls for a more pluralistic theory and research methodologies that may 
accommodate various seemingly inconsistent aspects of patent law and the pat-
ent system. While it is true that efficiency, as applied to specific cases, may be 
definable with the help of further normative criteria, the indeterminacy of the 
efficiency is so great that it cannot serve as a sole normative criterion. As there is 
no uniform theory of the patent institution, studying it should be pluralistic and 
functional, and application-specific and contextual. The focus of research should 
be then not on whether an institution is efficient, but why a certain definition of 
efficiency or which institution of patent should be more socially acceptable and 
efficacious in achieving a specifically defined goal.
A pluralistic perspective makes it possible to view patent right as both ex-
clusive and coordinating, and the system of patent as having multiple institu-
tions that may provide for exclusion or coordinate innovative activities. The essay 
points out different characterizations of patent right and patent law, either as a 
property right or policy instrument leading to different normative advices. This 
implies the impact of exclusive rights on coordination may also be approached 
differently, according to the normative inclination.
2.2. PROPRIETARY STANDARDS AND PATENT LAW
2.2.1. Overall Objectives of Publication 2
This essay aims to develop one of the themes identified in the first essay in greater 
detail – the interaction of patent law and alternative institutional arrangements 
in the market and the firm surrounding technological standards. Publication 2 
discusses standardization in the ICT industry pertaining to interoperability and 
compatibility and how this relates to patent law. Technological standards enable 
modular productions to manage complexity in products. In this sense, standardi-
zation is a private ordering in the market to coordinate technical fragmentation 
in business and market practices. 
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This essay reviews the impact of exclusive right on standardization. Standards 
inherently require accessibility, while patent rights are inherently based on the 
possibility to exclude. If interface standards can be privately owned and control-
led, exclusive right may transfer the very benefit of the standardization to the 
private right-holder, allowing the right-holder to collect a toll on the standards. 
The essay notes that the exclusive rights of patent may confer such power on the 
right-holder, subjecting the standard to a capture or hold-up by the assertion of 
the patent-holder. Furthermore, the essay identifies characteristics of patent right 
that may be inherently adverse to standardization. It asks whether a patent right 
is inherently in conflict with efficient development compatibility standards and 
aims to suggest institutional solutions that can be devised.
2.2.2. Findings and Main Contribution
The essay finds that in order to be functional and accessible, interface standards 
need to be public, non-discriminatory, and well understood. In contrast, patent 
rights are private, involve arbitrary decision-making by the right-holder and are 
often complex to understand. In order to overcome negative aspects of exclusive 
rights, a Standard Setting Organization (SSO) often institutes internal intellectual 
property policy that attempts to deal with strategic and opportunistic behaviors of 
the participants and right-holders. The rules often include such licensing princi-
ples as Fair and Reasonable And Non Discriminatory (FRAND or RAND) terms 
for essential patent disclosure or notification rules.
The essay also discusses the interplay of market practices after the grant of 
patent right and legal changes. It notes that while patent law and market are alter-
native institutions, the order created in these institutions may be in direct conflict 
with each other, thus the benefit of private ordering or the benefit of having the 
exclusive right of property may be cancelled out by the costs imposed by each 
institutional arrangement. The essay also points out that other institutional solu-
tions are a possibility. Using administrative agencies such as competition or anti-
trust administration authorities, interfacing the patent law and patent adminis-
tration with competition policy is possible. Enforcing private ordering documents 
such as the patent policy of a standard setting organizing is another solution. The 
essay, however, highlights the solution of recalibration through interpretation of pat-
ent law. There are areas of patent law where interpretative or conceptual analysis 
may be necessary to ameliorate this conflict of legislation and private ordering in 
the market; this essay also reiterates the need to craft doctrine in law to accom-
modate standardization. 
To recalibrate the right, it is necessary to identify those aspects in patent law 
that permit incremental changes by the court. The main contribution of this paper 
is that it identifies three aspects of patent right and the process of patent prosecu-
tion that may hinder the development of functioning and accessible standards. 
First, the scope of a patent is complex and the textual disclosure required in 
the patent law is a poor fit to ICT subject matter. As a result, it is difficult to predict 
if a patent claim can read on a technical standard in advance. Secondly, the lag in 
the timing of patent publication and the adoption of the related standard subjects 
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the disclosure and licensing of the patents on interface standard to opportunism. 
If it is possible to avoid publishing the patent application until grant, the right-
holder may delay disclosure during the patent prosecution process. At the same 
time, complexity in patent claims may make it difficult to predict which aspect of a 
standard would be covered by the disclosed patent applications. As a result, objec-
tively identifying essential patents against the adopted standard may become so 
difficult that the right-holders may selectively disclose relevant patents that may 
be subject to the rules of standard setting. Thirdly, as patent right-holders may 
restrict field of uses.  Field of use restriction forms the core of the patent right and 
is often used in a license agreement.106 Coupled with the injunctive relief, the field 
of use restriction can be used to deny access to the patented part of the standard.
In conclusion, this paper argues that as a consequence of expansionary chan-
ges in patent law, patents over technical standards are present as a matter of 
fact. Presence of patent right over the technical specification of a standard may 
create problems over the standard adoption process. Assertion of rights after the 
adoption standard likewise creates concerns. The paper suggests that a solution 
to the problematic behaviors of the right-holders should be sought within patent 
law through interpretative doctrines recalibrating the strength of property right 
in a more flexible manner. 
2.3. PATENTED STANDARDS AND THE TRAGEDY OF ANTI-COMMONS
2.3.1. Overall Objectives
This paper develops the findings of Publication 2 from a more theoretical perspec-
tive. It applies theories of property to patent law, in the context of patented stand-
ards in the ICT industry. As shown in the Publication 1, different views towards 
the nature of patent law and the patent institution, either as a property institution 
or a policy instrument, lead to different normative advices on IP law. In fact, the 
policy recommendation of one application could differ so greatly from another 
that they could be said to recommend opposite positions. The application of prop-
erty theories to IP is not uniformly negative or positive. This is partly because, 
as the modern property discourse itself has diversified from an outright property 
absolutism to an extreme denunciation of property, different uses of property 
theories result in different policy recommendations for intellectual property. 
This article first places patented standards into the debates on property theo-
ries and then evaluates the application of four strands of property theory that 
have been influential in IP literature. In particular, this paper asks if the lessons 
of property theories, such as anti-commons theory, can be transferred to under-
standing problems surrounding standardization in the ICT industry. It asks if the 
changed context for creating and adopting standards are direct results of the prop-
ertization of IP, and which theory would be useful to limit the negative effects of 
fragmentation. In particular, this article discusses whether it would help to explain 
106 This is evident again in the recent US Supreme court decision on Quanta Computer, Inc,  v. LG 
electronics  (2008). 128 S. Ct. 2109,; 170 L. Ed. 2d 996, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4702; 76 U.S.L.W. 4375. 
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whether rational choices could lead to an irrational outcome, thus resulting in a 
tragedy that calls for an institutional interference.
Property-centric theory emphasizing only similarity of IP and property right 
may treat the subject matter of IP which is in its essence non-rival information, in 
the same manner as the tangible and rival goods that are the subject of property 
right. Treating these two fundamental different goods in the same manner leads 
to further confusion. Use of congestion externalities i.e. over-use in the identified 
product market created by the intellectual property to justify why more rights 
need to be granted is based on the confusion over the fundamental nature of the 
right, which is non-rival. In contrast, the anti-commons theory emphasizes the 
failure of transaction and fragmentation which arises. Applying anti-commons 
theory to patent seems to be more useful because it does not require the resources 
to be rival, but simply the rights to be equally exclusive to dictate certain pattern 
of behavior in the right holders.  
2.3.2. Findings and Main Contribution
Coordination of fragments is central in anti-commons theory. In this regard, the 
main contribution of this paper is that it identifies a theoretical space for a coor-
dination-based approach to patent law. The paper points out that strong property 
rules with multiple claim-holders in a specific technological area may create a 
coordination problem by fragmenting the core of the rights. At the same time 
the paper suggests that solutions to this problem may be found in three different 
institutions – law, administration and market. 
This paper identifies and assesses three types of institutional arrangements 
as solutions - by not granting such property rights (i.e. an administrative and 
legislative solution), by recalibrating the rights at the use and enforcement stage 
(a judicial solution) and by encouraging the emergence of norms for coordination 
to emerge (a market-based solution).
The first solution would in practice mean rejecting a patent on ICT standards. 
This solution cannot be implemented by the administrative agency because an 
industry-specific exclusion of patent-eligible subject matter, in most jurisdic-
tions, no longer exists in the law. Not granting ICT standard patents on useful 
and essential information processing is impossible under the current laws of 
Japan, the United States and the EPC, and would be contrary to TRIPs obligations. 
Furthermore, even if a legislative solution were sought and patents laws were to 
be revised so as not to grant such patents, it would not eliminate the problems 
of already granted patents. Moreover, patent offices may lack the competence to 
engage in an identification of patents on standards prior to their grant, and it 
may not be desirable for patent offices to selectively discriminate in this manner. 
Thus, prevention at the grant level is neither possible nor desirable. However, if a 
legislative solution is sought, it may be better regulated through more behavior-
specific regulations directly related to a specific use restriction and not through 
a blanket rejection of patent application. This may take the form of competition 
law or anti-trust or monopoly law against misuses, or through flexible uses of such 
patent law doctrines of secondary infringement liability.
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 A second solution is a recalibration of the right when it is enforced. At the 
enforcement stage, the scope of a patent right described in the claim text gets 
specified against the accused infringing conduct and products implementing in-
ventive idea. In this sense, courts do have a room to calibrate the specific scope of 
a patent right, utilizing interpretative doctrines in patent law. One example that is 
more relevant to fragmentation is partial infringement theory which would allow 
assertion of a patent right by a partial use. The court may refuse to enforce frag-
mented assertion of a right by rejecting such doctrinal theory. A partial infringe-
ment theory or the element protection doctrine may allow the division of a patent 
right into fragments of claims. Rejection of partial infringement theory, courts 
discourage further fragmentations of essential patents into essential elements. 
Thirdly, formation of an institution with enforceable rules of behavior to man-
age fragments either formally, as in the cases of patent pools and SSOs, or infor-
mally, such as in the case of a norm community, has been suggested. However, 
both formal or informal institutions do have limited usefulness. Patent pools may 
involve problems concerning the entry of the non-right holder, thus may be pro-
moting a negative type of coordination. Additionally, SSOs rule may not apply to 
non-members who have valid patents over key standards and thus has limited 
application. Another probable and socially desirable policy would be to encourage 
the development of user community norms, regulating licensing practices. In a 
close-knit community group, the presence of norms may encourage the access and 
use of standards that would otherwise be anti-commons property. The creation of 
norms may encourage right-holders not to assert their rights on essential patents 
and in fragments. Informal norms, however, are difficult to form and the process 
of how the norms are formed is often not so transparent and difficult to monitor. 
Enforcement is also a problem as often the enforcement may be voluntary. 
2.4. FRAGMENTED INFRINGEMENT OF COMPUTER PROGRAM PAT-
ENTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
2.4.1. Overall Objectives
This essay follows and develops a court-based solution to ameliorate the negative 
impact of fragmentation and expands the scope of discussion to include multi-ju-
risdictional fragmentation – the geographic fragmentation of a right. As observed 
in Publication 2 and 3, when an invention is readily divisible, the uses of that in-
vention may become fragmented under certain conditions. The two Publications 
also predicted that if the right-holders are allowed to assert their right in frag-
ments, the problems of coordination would worsen.
In this context, this publication aims to identify which doctrines developed 
by the judiciary may be used by the right-holders to divide the invention in frag-
ments. Computer program and Internet-related patents bring this question to the 
fore. This is partly because the practices of the computer programming industry 
are becoming increasingly cumulative, incremental and distributive. Patents on 
such subject matters tend to reflect their modular characteristics. This is seen to 
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increase the possibility of partial or incomplete infringement. Furthermore, in 
today’s global economy, modular production of computer program products of-
ten involves cross-border production and distribution, using various production 
factors. Thus the use of the invention can be modular and may involve multiple 
actors. In contrast, patent rights need to be enforced and asserted territorially, 
based on a model of use by a single complete action taking place in one territory. 
This paper seeks to review how computer program and Internet-related pat-
ents challenge the model of a single infringer within one territory performing one 
complete action. The paper explores judicial doctrines and interpretative principles 
surrounding partial uses and aims at identifying which of these doctrines may al-
low right-holders to rely on fragmented uses to assert their rights. In other words, it 
examines if patent infringement may arise based on partial uses in the patent law 
and cases law of Japan, the United States and Europe. 
2.4.2. Findings and Main Contribution
The publication finds two types of partial uses whereby the right-holder may di-
vide the patent right. First, right-holders may restrict directly the conduct of par-
tial uses. This would be the case when users engage in some but not all aspects of 
carrying out the invention, as shown in Figure 1. Right-holders, for example, can 
partially authorize some types of conduct and reject others. In all the jurisdictions 
reviewed, this selective authorization seems to be allowed. However, as the leg-
islations often refers to “making, selling and using” as working of the inventions, 
this paper finds that the courts have some discretion to interpret whether a certain 
conduct, for example, combining, repairing or modification of a computer program 
and program codes, falls within the list of conducts that inherently belong to the 
right-holder, which may give rise to direct or indirect patent infringement liability. 
The second type of partial use occurs when the claims of a patent right include 
modules of the invention that may be divided and practiced in parts, as shown in 
the Figure 2 above. The essay finds in this case, partial infringement theory may 
allow assertion of a right when some elements of claims that are comprised of 
several steps are used but not the others. In this context, the essay finds that there 
are two types of fragmentation in the assertion of a patent right – one is the case 
of procedural fragmentation and the other is the case of substantive fragmenta-
tion. A procedural fragmentation occurs when there are parallel patents are held 
by one person over the same subject matter in different jurisdictions that have 
to be enforced in a consolidated manner. This type of fragmentation is in a sense 
unavoidable because patent rights have territorial effect, based on national grants 
exercising sovereign authority. Procedural fragmentation may be avoided through 
international conventions seeking uniform or at least harmonized rules of proce-
dure.107 In contrast, a single patent may be substantively fragmented when there is 
a partial use distributed in multiple jurisdictions, as in the Figure 2. Enforcement 
in this case is fragmented by each geographic jurisdiction and the courts need to 
107 On the future direction of international convention, see Drexl Josef and Annette Kur (2005) ed. 
Intellectual Property and Private International Law: Heading for the Future. IIC Studies. Hart 
Publishing. 
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find relevant patent doctrines to consolidate fragmented uses either to enforce or 
to reject enforcement of rights. 
The paper finds that patent laws of the United States, Japan and to some extent 
in Europe, have doctrines related to liability arising out on partial use of a patented 
invention. While, the courts are reluctant to enforce partial assertion of a right un-
der a direct and literal infringement liability, courts may allow partial assertion of 
a right under indirect infringement liability or under the doctrine of equivalents, 
depending on the type of claims. If there are patents on standards, a code dupli-
cation to achieve interoperability of computer programs often results in a partial 
use of the invention, as it would necessarily duplicate part of the codes or program 
functions that cover the interface.  In this sense, nearly all computer program 
products adopting an interface standard need to duplicate the standardized codes 
or functions to achieve interoperability, and this would likely be a cause of action 
for indirect infringement liability, if the right-holders were to assert their rights. 
However, the paper finds that at least in multi-jurisdictional substantive frag-
mentation, courts are reluctant to consolidate fragments that are located outside 
the territory of the country of the patent grants, and to allow coordination in court 
to reach the level of element protection.  As seen above, while partial uses are reg-
ulated under some patent laws, the liability of multiple users in multiple territories 
raises complex questions about whether their conduct or actions may be combined 
or consolidated. The paper concludes that courts may have to make policy choices 
– a broad finding of liability in the use of components of inventions beyond the 
granting territory may be an over-protection and finding no liability may promote 
modular production and may create markets in products and services. 
The main contribution of this paper is that it assesses a court-based solution 
to the problem of fragmentation. Furthermore, it identifies a policy space for the 
judiciary in the enforcement of the patent. This is because regulating one act as 
direct or indirect infringement requires a normative policy choice that balances 
the exclusive rights of the patentee and the rights of the users of the patented in-
novation. Fragmentation here is more strongly determined because it deals with 
factual fragmentation, where the invention can be practiced in modules and be 
located in a distributed manner. Coordination in practice would require the use 
in its entirety of the patented invention. However, when the fragments are dis-
tributed in different jurisdictions, coordination of the fragments of the invention 
is in practice accomplished by the end-users. In this context, the enforcement of 
the rights over the coordination of the users presents particular doctrinal and 
interpretative challenges to the courts, as patent law tends to hold only direct and 
complete uses as infringement.  
Coordination in this case may also be carried out by the firms that exploit dif-
ferent production factors to achieve global economies of scale. While the courts 
seem reluctant to include the coordination of fragments at the end-users as an 
infringing conduct, they appear to regulate the conduct of firms that act as inter-
mediaries to allow end-users to combine their acts toward direct infringement, 
under the indirect patent infringement liability. In this manner, the judiciary 
seems to take coordination into consideration. 
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2.5. EXCLUSION AND COORDINATION IN COLLABORATIVE INNOVA-
TION AND PATENT LAW
2.5.1. Overall Objective
Publication 5 addresses the contradiction of exclusion of intellectual property 
rights, with the example of patent right, and the need to coordinate resources in 
collaboration. The paper aims to apply insight from organizational research to 
broaden the concept of private ordering as an alternative institutional arrange-
ment to manage fragmentation. 
Intellectual property law has been criticized for an over-arching scope of pro-
tection and, at the same time, insufficient protection. This seeming contradiction 
may stem from the discrepancies between the actual innovation practice and pro-
cess and the models adopted in law. This paper illustrates this contradiction in 
the treatment of collaborative innovators in patent laws. This study, in particular, 
examines how the participation of multiple innovators at the initial stage of the 
innovation is regulated under the patent laws in the United States, Japan and, to 
some extent, in Europe. A single entity perspective and the concurrent closed 
invention model implied in law create legal uncertainties for collaborative innova-
tors. Uncertainties in collaboration highlights the significance of organizational 
capability providing an inter- and intra-firm governance structure over the in-
novative process and the uses of innovation in managing the uncertainties before, 
during and after collaboration. Organizational capability seems to play a central 
role in addressing the seeming contradiction.
2.5.2. Findings and Main Contribution 
This paper reviews a case where multiple actors are involved in the creation of 
inventions and what aspects of their actions leading to different claims to pat-
ent proprietorship. An increasingly iterative and collaborative innovation process 
highlights the importance of having a governance mechanism to provide coor-
dination over the uses or resources, collaborative outcome, with clear rules of 
sharing and rules for claiming proprietorship in advance.  The paper finds that 
where there are no clear norms or rules, an ex ante contractual arrangement and 
a firm-internal process are the next best solution for coordinating the use of right. 
The paper distinguishes a closed and concurrent inventive process concerning 
collaborative innovation. The concurrent inventive process deals with two or more 
separate entities working on different paths toward the same innovative technology, 
and competing with each other. The process of concurrent invention is a simultane-
ous but closed one.  In contrast, a collaborative innovation process follows a path 
that may be pursued jointly and simultaneously by multiple innovators and identi-
fies collaborative innovation as an area where ex ante coordination over sharing the 
results of collaboration as well as the appropriation becomes crucially important.  
This paper identifies in most patent laws, the process of innovation and inven-
tion is presumed to be concurrent and closed. The rights are granted based on 
the first connection thesis- only the first person who connects and act according 
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to the process of acquiring the right is granted an exclusive right over all others 
who may have engaged in the same inventive efforts. If patent system aims to 
encourage disclosure of the invention through the grant of the exclusive right, 
the disclosure that is encouraged by the model of closed innovation that current 
patent law adopts is only the disclosure at the patent filing, at the earliest. To the 
contrary, the patent law in its current shape actively discourages disclosure before 
the patent filing. 
In practice, however, innovation processes are less and less likely to be based 
on a closed action of a single actor. Especially in the industry where the life cycle 
of the innovation is short, the competition is high, or the product is complex, more 
of the innovation may be based on open and collaborative exchanges among plural 
entities and actors. To interface the innovation practice of collaboration with the 
requirements in law, firms utilize various private ordering measures and man-
age the degree of openness. Using the example of collaborative benefit sharing 
and joint ownership of patent, this paper shows when the intellectual property 
based protection is weak, uncertain and incomplete, the capabilities of a firm to 
coordinate the exclusion and exchange surrounding the innovation may make 
differences in the firms’ performances.
The main contribution of this paper is to review the interaction of patent law 
and the market and highlight the fact that efficient management of intellectu-
al property needs to take into account the existence of alternative incentives in 
the market, as well as the governance mechanisms in the market which manage 
the uses of the intangible innovations. Thus, this paper broadens the concept 
of private ordering mechanism. The paper identifies informal norms, contrac-
tual arrangement and firm-internal organizational process as the governance 
mechanisms administrating the uses of a collaborative outcome, in addition to 
intellectual property rights. Studies on governance as a private ordering have 
so far focused more on cases where fragmented rights are pooled into a usable 
package, after the rights are granted.  Private ordering of this kind is based on 
the intellectual property rights with norms or contractual arrangement as a gov-
ernance means. This paper adds to this the internal governance structure or an 
organization’s coordination process that is used instead of, or complementing the 
protection of intellectual property.  
In particular, the paper applies process-oriented insights from organization-
al research to the collaborative innovation process and joint ownership, where 
claims of entitlement to the right can be fragmented even before the right is ac-
quired.  Fragmentation in this case is caused by multiple entitlement-holders to a 
right to patent before the grant of the right.  By emphasizing contractual arrange-
ment and organizational process before and during the innovation, this paper 
reveals the details of a market-based institutional arrangement to deal with the 
problem of fragmentation. 
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3. Summary and 
Conclusions
3.1. SUMMARY 
The study first explored the general underpinnings of the patent system, and 
claimed that a pluralistic perspective needs to be adopted in the theories of patent 
law and intellectual property. This was followed by essays exploring fragmen-
tation in a particular context – in the law and the market surrounding the ICT 
industry and how the rights and underlying innovation are used and enforced. 
Based on the patent laws and practices in Japan, the United States and in Europe, 
this study examined if fragmentation calls for a revision in the roles for the insti-
tutions of the patent system – namely the legislation, the administrative agencies, 
the court and the market. Finally, the research revisited the initial stage of inno-
vation and considered the phase where the initial claim to the right itself can be 
fragmented by the involvement of multiple parties. The nature of the fragmenta-
tion at this stage differs because multiple parties participating in the collaborative 
innovation process require coordination ex ante, while the fragmentation in rights 
and uses after the grant requires coordination ex post.
The first essay explores the general underpinnings of the patent system, and 
argues a case for adopting a pluralistic perspective on the efficacy of the patent in-
stitution. When a pluralistic perspective is adopted, the impact of exclusive rights 
on coordination can be approached from a variety of angles including property-
centric and instrumentalist one, allowing partial explanation. Property-centric 
theory reviewed in the essay seems to view the question of coordination as sec-
ondary to the primary concern of exclusion. Property-centric theory treats the 
coordinating impact of a right over the use of the tangible resources before the inven-
tion, in the sense that knowing exclusive right will be granted allows inventors to 
engage in the inventive process and disclosure their invention. Thus before the 
right is granted, the rights would provide incentive to efficiently use resources. On 
the other hand, once the right has been granted, exclusion from the right coordi-
nates the uses of the resources indirectly in the sense that knowledge of exclusive 
right indirectly discourages duplicative research effort. However, the coordina-
tion on how the rights may be used is not actively considered. Implicitly, it may be 
extrapolated that any use of innovation, after the grant, may be concentrated in 
the first actor (inventor, or creator), who invested and coordinated the tangible re-
sources for the production of that innovation. In contrast, instrumentalist theory, 
which views patent right as a means to achieve a socially desirable goal, considers 
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positive coordination primarily as either incentives for production or as a means 
to provide orderly or pro-competitive development of the innovation. In other 
words, how the rights may be used after the grant is one of the primary concerns. 
From this point of view, not only the impact of rights on the uses of resources, but 
also how the rights and the assertion of rights may be coordination, and the cost 
of this coordination of rights are considered as determinants of policy.
This is followed by three essays exploring fragmentation in a particular con-
text. Fragmentation over the use of resources and in a granted right is a typically 
coordination problem. The essays explore the extent of fragmentation in the use 
and the enforcement of patent rights under the laws of Japan, the United States and 
in Europe. Collectively they examine multiple institutional solutions, namely the 
legislative institution (in patent law), the administrative agencies (patent offices 
and competition authorities), the court and the market (self-regulation or private 
ordering) and how they treat the problem of fragmentation. 
In particular, the second essay discusses standardization and claims that pat-
ents seem to cause problems for standardization, which is a private ordering so-
lution to technological complexity. This was largely due to the core characteristic 
of a patent right as private property with the possibility of private exclusion and 
restriction of uses. It claims that while the other institutional solutions are pos-
sible, solutions may be found in the recalibration of this aspect of patent right in 
the court. 
The third essay strengthens this finding by examining the coordination prob-
lem in more detail. The essay found that a solution to fragmentation using pat-
ent law and not granting patent right (i.e. relying on patentability rule in law)  is 
unfeasible, while using a more behaviour-specific regulation either in patent law 
(i.e. indirect or direct infringement liability over a particular conduct) or competi-
tion law to encourage positive coordination is possible. Private ordering such as a 
standard setting organization and a patent pool to coordinate fragmented uses is 
viewed positively. However, private ordering may suffer from opportunistic and 
strategic behaviour such as hold-up, as argued in the second essay. Similarly, a 
norm community surrounding the fragmented rights and resources is encour-
aged, but norms are difficult to develop and enforce. Together, the second and the 
third essays recommend court-based solutions that recalibrate the scope and strength 
of a right and that may influence enforceability of a specific use restriction in a li-
censing agreement. The fourth essay, in particular, explores court-based solutions 
concerning fragmentation of a right in the form of the enforcement of partial uses 
of an invention. 
In contrast, the final essay considers a fragmentation in the initial phase, 
where the claim for the entitlement may be fragmented. In the particular context 
of collective and collaborative innovation, the final essay indicates that the par-
ticipation of multiple parties in the innovative process highlights the contractual 
arrangement as an ex ante private ordering and the firm-internal processes and 
routines (i.e. organizational capabilities) that manage the flow of knowledge ex-
change during the initial phase of collaboration. 
  49
3.2. CONCLUSIONS
This research contributes to patent law theories by clarifying some of the key 
concepts used in the theoretical discussion of patent rights and by applying a 
multi-institutional analysis to the regulation of fragmentation of rights. The re-
search clarifies the concepts of coordination, exclusion and fragmentation, in the 
context of intellectual property theories and identifies legal doctrines or conven-
tions in patent law that may widen the gap between innovation practices and the 
model implicitly used in law. In particular, the research finds that the singular 
identity perspective adopted in patent law based on the tangible property right 
maintains the gap.
3.2.1. Fragmentation of Patent Right 
Innovation requires both the incentives of exclusion and the means to coordinate 
the tangible or intangible resources as input and outcome to this process. The five 
essays collected in this volume discuss the aspects of governance and exclusion 
provided by patent protections. In conclusion, the research claims that a single 
entity and a single institution perspective in the construction of the patent system 
inevitably fails to take into account the fragmentation of rights and uses, and this 
may further underplay the importance of coordination.
Taken together, the essays explore different institutional solutions to the prob-
lem of fragmentation. The research identified three types of fragmentation of 
patent right and explored the causes and solutions differently - (1) fragmentation 
in entitlement to a right, ex ante, (2) fragmentation of rights, post grant, and (3) 
geographical fragmentation. 
Fragmentation is caused by an interrelated combination of factual and legal 
elements. Factual elements here range from industry structures, economic fac-
tors that encourage modular production and management of complexity, and the 
technical difficulty to precisely claim the abstract object of a patent right. Legal 
elements of fragmentation include the concurrent and overlapping scope of pat-
ent rights, the territorial effect of domestic law and the legal convention of con-
centrating a property right in a single entity. Different factual and legal elements 
suggest that coordination of these fragments be specifically tailored to each type 
of fragmentation. At the extreme, no coordination of factual fragmentation may 
be necessary and coordination may even lead to anti-competitive collusion.108 In 
contrast, some fragmentations seem to be tied to legal convention and expansion-
ist changes in law. In this manner, when a legal convention or a legal change has 
a direct consequence on how the uses of an invention may be coordinated, insti-
tutional interference may be necessary. 
3.2.2. Coordination of Fragments and Patent Theory
While previous literature generally used the concept of coordination to mean co-
ordinating the behavior of the actors, this research further elaborated the concept 
108  Kieff, supra note 43
50
of coordination to include coordination over the allocation and uses of resources, 
entitlement and rights. The research found that coordination of uses of resources 
as well as the rights may be carried out by private individuals in the market, 
and institutions may encourage or discourage coordination. The institutional ar-
rangements for coordination include not only private ordering activities of stake-
holders and firms, but also public ordering by the judiciary and administrative 
agencies such as patent offices and competition authorities.  
Despite the significance of coordination, aspects of coordination have previ-
ously been under-researched, in contrast to aspects of exclusion and incentive. 
Both positivist and normative research focuses on exclusive rights, the institu-
tional arrangement surrounding those rights and the impact on incentives for 
creation or disclosure.  In particular, the concept of coordination needs to be 
framed according to the type of fragmentation identified in the literature. As seen 
above, fragmentation could roughly be present at three levels - in the entitlement 
of rights, the use of rights, and in enforcement. Accordingly, coordination is thus 
required in terms of the use of resources necessary for innovative activities, in the 
uses of rights over the innovative outcome (including license and exchange, com-
mercialization) and in the assertion of right.
(1) Coordinating fragmentation in the pre-grant entitlement to a right
Patent law, by entitling the right to file for patent to the inventor, coordinates the 
question of pre-grant and pre-filing uses of resources. In particular, patent law 
uses the first connection thesis as a way of coordinating the fragmentation in 
the entitlements. The first connection thesis artificially constructs a binary rela-
tionship between the object and the claim-holder to the entitlement109 and of the 
claim-holders with the right to file for invention, only a single entity is granted 
the right of patent, based on the first connection thesis.
This initial grant of right based on first connection thesis seemed to be down-
played in a property centric law and economics literature.110 This is due to the 
fact that when the transaction cost is zero, the initial allocation of property rights 
would not matter because the parties will efficiently exchange them according to 
the optimal preference maximization.111 Who gets the initial entitlement would 
not matter as long as the trading of such initial entitlement can be done without 
further costs. Indeed, in most countries, the right to file for patent is transferable 
and assignable.112  From this standpoint, it is recommended that intellectual prop-
erty law reforms and policy proposals should analogously strive to approximate 
the conditions of zero transaction cost. 
As in the case of tangible properties, this means that the boundary of the 
property must be clear, and that the protection and the enforcement of right, i.e. 
the exclusivity, must be nearly perfect. Imperfect or incomplete property with in-
109 See infra, Publication 5, Part II, at 82-83 (original pagination).
110 See for example, Epstein, Richard A (2006) The Structural Unity of Real and  Intellectual Property, 
The Progress & Freedom Foundation.  Available on line. <http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/
pop13.24 RAE_9_26.pdf>, [Last Visted on 10, March 2009]
111 Coase, R. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1-44.
112 See infra, Publication 5, Part II, at 82-83 (original pagination).
  51
adequate enforcement, in contrast, increases the transaction cost, as it would lead 
to a situation where the entitlement to a right itself will be disputed and contested. 
In this regard, we can make an intuitive conclusion that an incomplete property 
does not lead to an efficient transaction, and may lead to an inefficient outcome 
and allocation of resources. 
Furthermore, alternative institutional arrangements are often viewed nega-
tively by the property-centric perspective, because it may further distribute ti-
tles or create information costs of having to determine what aspects are subject 
to these other institutional arrangements. In other words, this exclusion-centric 
approach may assess the alternative means of coordination in the absence of the 
property right negatively.113 This includes private ordering such as coordination 
by contracts, community norms or informal ordering or organizational routines 
or processes that may directly coordinate the use of the resources within a firm. 
From this perspective, the task of intellectual property law reform and com-
petition policy would become that of reducing the uncertainty or incomplete-
ness of the entitlement. Perfecting the incomplete right would then be viewed as 
the policy goals of intellectual property law reform. Thus it would recommend 
changes in law that make the scope of right clear and enforcement easy. Moreover, 
a concentration of the right in a small number of right-holders, even trans-terri-
torially, would be recommended, since it would reduce the transaction costs due 
to the coordination problem. 
Likewise, if coordination of fragmentation only serves for orderly develop-
ment of the technology and innovation process, the policy recommendation of 
patent prospect theory would be the solution to fragmentation. As reviewed in 
Publication 1, Kitch’s theory of patent prospect inevitably advocates a strong and 
broad patent right. This view would also be supported by the property-centric 
theory. However, as shown above, fragmentation may be caused by the conven-
tions adopted by the law themselves. Particularly in the ICT industry, overlap-
ping and concurrent scope is caused by a lack of precise boundary definition and 
exclusion without governance. Thus, broadly recalibrating the scope of the right 
in court may not provide a solution, while timing of the grant of right, however, 
may provide a solution by coordinating the entitlement to a right earlier. However, 
uncertainty on how technological prospect may develop, the optimal timing is 
hard to predict precisely. 
This research claimed that the private ordering minimizing transaction costs 
may be beneficial in the management of the pre-grant entitlement to patent.  As 
long as patent law adopts the first connection thesis as the basis for granting the 
right, it is difficult to use patent law to regulate the relationship of the collaborator. 
The court does have a limited role in coordination, because it can review private 
ordering practice, either in the interpretation of patent law defence such as prior-
user defence or in the interpretation of the contractual arrangement to protect 
113 See, for example, Merges, R.P. (2005) A Transactional View of Property Rights, Berkeley Center for 
Law and Technology, Law and Technology Scholarship (selected by the Berkeley Center for Law & 
Technology), paper 8, available on the Internet. <http://repositories.cdlib.org/ bclt/lts/8> [Last vis-
ited on 19 January, 2008], arguing that property rights provide better enforcement means. 
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the interests of the collaborators in continuing the use of their own share of the 
contribution. However, the courts may only intervene when there are clear dis-
pute and thus may only limitedly influence the coordination, ex post. In contrast, 
patent offices as an administrative agency may not be equipped to find factual 
information on the collaborative contribution of the parties, as part of the pat-
ent prosecution. Furthermore, collaborating parties have the best information on 
the ratio of the collaborative contribution. Thus, in case where there are clearly 
identifiable collaborators and actors, the Publication 5 advocated contracts and firm 
internal organizational routines as solutions that provides a governance mecha-
nism over pre-grant entitlement, because they may ex ante, concentrate the right 
to one entity (either firm, one of the inventors or a third party), and may specify 
the order and hierarchy of uses. 
(2) Post-grant Coordination of Fragments of Multiple Uses 
Coordination in intellectual property theory literature is found in the works of the 
scholars who approached coordination by drawing analogies between tangible 
property and intellectual property114 or highlight the transaction costs that prop-
erty rights may cause.115  As reviewed in Publication 2 and 3, exclusive right may 
coordinate particular types of fragmentation of the multiple uses that arise after 
the invention and the grant of rights. However, as seen in Publication 2 and 3, 
the exclusive rights of patent over technological standards seem to create rather 
than alleviate a particular coordination problem. A proposal for good coordination 
based on a perfectly defined, strong and enforceable property right may fail to take 
into account that the exchanges in intangible resources cannot be analogous to ex-
changes in the tangibles. The binary relationship of right and use that allows the 
transaction of the right attached to the single subject matter of protection cannot be 
formed in the intangible resources. Therefore even if theoretically, a boundary of an 
object of intellectual property  may be drawn, the right by itself cannot resolve the 
coordination problem created by the plurality in the relationship among the objects 
of exchange, use  and the right surrounding the intangible subject matters of right. 
Technical difficulty to precisely define and to claim the abstract object of pat-
ent is further exacerbated to the gap between the legal convention and prac-
tice. The legal convention of textual claim leads to granting of rights that may 
be overlapping in scope. Currently, patent law in most countries adopts the legal 
convention of patent claims that require the patent applicant to describe the tech-
nology in textual forms.116 In a sense, the text of claims is equivalent to the text 
of contract, where society grants rights and obligations to the patent right-holder 
and the public, who need to respect the right of the patentee based on the text of 
the claims. At the same time, the legal convention defining the scope of a right is 
114 See, for example, Landes and Posner (2003), supra note 38.
115 See, for example, Heller and Eisenberg (1998), supra note 2, review in Publication 3, Part II of 
this book.
116 See Publication 2, Part II infra, at 10-11. See also Thomas, John R. (1998) Of Text, Technique, And 
The Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 219, 
and Lee (2000), supra note 69.
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analogous to title deeds to an immovable object of real property. However, unlike 
the paper title, the description of the patent claim often is a poor fit to the func-
tional technology and thus the actual and precise boundary of a patent’s exclusive 
right is difficult to define, until it is disputed. Given this difficulty of clearly defin-
ing the scope of right, an overlapping right in a core technology or over a single 
systems product is nearly unavoidable. 
Furthermore, the patent law’s adoption of a closed innovation model results 
in concurrent rights - multiple rights with a narrow scope, with an equally ex-
clusive effect over a same object. As a result, each right-holder may exclude one 
another equally and when there is no further hierarchy that prioritize the uses, 
fragmentation occurs, as seen in Publication 2 and 3. The closed innovation model 
encourages this, because it encourages innovators to keep the path of invention 
secret to preserve the novelty. In the industry where innovation is incremental 
such as ICT, this would result in multiple patents of narrow scope covering a 
promising patent prospect. 
Private ordering is often suggested as the solution to the coordination problem. 
The property-centric position recommends that if the boundary of the rights is 
clear and enforceable, the parties will privately trade the right. Collective rights 
management, patent pools, and cross-licensing platforms are typical examples of 
private ordering that manages multiple uses and multiple rights-holders where 
private parties pool the fragmented multiple uses into a usable bundle after the 
grant of right. Standard setting can also be framed as a private ordering to manage 
the complexity of the technologies through modular production, and thus manage 
fragmentation in the technology. While patent pools are private ordering means 
to manage the rights, standard setting itself is not a private ordering to manage 
the fragmentation of multiple uses but rather dictated by the drive for having 
standard. As patent pools and standardization are subject to negative opportun-
ism such as hold-up or capture by the right-holders, and hold-out, they may not 
present a categorical solution to coordination problem. 
Furthermore, exclusion over the fragmented technology is shown to frustrate 
the benefit of standardization. While private ordering at various levels is viewed 
positively, the patent policies or licensing rules of these private ordering institu-
tions need to be enforceable. Informal norms is difficult to intentionally set, devel-
op and equally difficult to manage, and cognitive biases could exist that prevent 
these private ordering institutions to emerge. Both alternatives also suffer from 
the applicability of the rules of the private ordering institutions to non-members. 
Based on these observations, the research recommends a recalibration of the 
scope and strength of a right and the validity of the specific use restriction in licensing 
agreement at the judiciary to promote coordination.
(3) Post-grant Coordination of Geographically Fragmented Right 
As reviewed in Publication 4, a type of geographical fragmentation may be caused 
by the territorial effect of a patent right. The existence of parallel rights is unavoid-
able as long as the patent law and legal systems are based on domestic laws. In the 
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absence of a uniform supranational patent law, a geographical fragmentation in the 
sense of parallel patent is inevitable. However, concentrating the right to a single 
entity, based on a first connection thesis, contributes to this type of fragmentation. 
International conventions have progressively harmonized the patent laws globally 
to the extent that the right is now uniformly granted to the first entity that acts on 
the invention,117 under the priority rules.118 As the rights may be claimed by one 
entity, but have to be claimed and exercised nationally, parallel patent applica-
tions in countries where the rights are sought are inevitable. Consequently, one 
invention may be the basis of multiple parallel rights by a single entity. When the 
parallel rights are viewed as the basis of a right that should have been uniformly 
enforced by the first actor, then the right can be said to be fragmented. Coordinated 
assertion of the parallel rights is more procedural than substantive.
In contrast, a right may become fragmented because of the nature of the under-
lying technology, such as Internet, or because of the global and modular production. 
Coordination in this substantive fragmentation of a technology may be done by the 
intermediate user of the technology, or by the end-user of the product embodying 
the technology. Substantive fragmentation presents peculiar challenge to the as-
sertion of a patent right and as Publication 4 noted, courts sometimes coordinate 
fragmented uses when enforcing the right, through various doctrinal theories on 
non-complete uses i.e. indirect infringement liability.
Coordination in the assertion of right is closely tied to the degree and strength 
of the property rights regime over the intangible resources. The research finds 
that the positive coordination resulting from the property right depends on the 
clarity and the enforceability of the rights. This finding coincides with the claims 
of Lemley and Weiser, who argued in the context of American patent law that the 
ability to define and enforce property rights effectively justifies the protection 
through property rules.119 A closer look reveals that the strength of the exclusive 
right indirectly coordinates how the rights are to be used through their calibration 
at the judiciary in regard to enforcement. In patent law, calibration of right means 
how the liabilities surrounding the infringement are structured and which types 
of remedies are used to enforce the right – either injunctive relief or damages. In 
Civil law literature, the right to enjoin infringing parities from engaging in the 
particular conduct, as opposed to the right to demand compensatory remuneration 
or damages, is often deemed one of the defining characteristics of a property right. 
In American law and economics literature, the distinction is termed as property 
rules versus liability rules. 120 When the courts have discretion to choose the means 
of enforcing the patent right, they may recalibrate the exclusion with by the degree 
of the remedy, with or without injunction and/or damages. Given this discretion, 
the judiciary may play a role in promoting positive or negative coordination. 
117 At the time of this writing, the first to invent principle of the US is slated to be overhauled by the 
Patent Reform Act of 2009 (S. 515/S. 610/H.R. 1260). 
118 Paris Convention, Art. 4, and also by virtue of TRIPs Agreement Art.2.1.
119 See Lemley and Weiser (2007), supra note 47 at 784.
120 The question was raised in connection to non-practicing entities in patent litigations, on when 
to grant injunctive relief for patent infringement, in the US Supreme Court case, eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, (2008) surpa note 28 at 393–394.
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3.2.3. Multi-Institutional Comparison for Coordination of Fragments
Intuitive observation suggests the following division of roles in each of the insti-
tutions based on the competences of the institutions to find the necessary infor-
mation to make decisions: Patent offices seem to have a superior competence on 
technical fact-finding, while the judiciary is superior in finding laws and calibra-
tion of rights. Articulation of law and policy is traditionally the domain of the 
legislative institution, while the practical implementation of law is closely tied to 
market, which has superior information over the value of the right. However, the 
simplistic picture cannot be maintained due to the diversity of the interests that 
are reflected in the process as well as the structural impediments and lack of ac-
curate information that provide predictability in the decision-making. 
Employing a multi-institutional comparison, this research suggests that a sin-
gle-institution-based solution to the coordination problem caused by fragmenta-
tion may not be useful. In this context, depending on the type of a fragmentation, 
a less imperfect choice seems to be a recalibration of right through the judiciary, 
complemented by various private ordering means, including norm communities, 
contract and the firm-internal process. Recalibration of a right is more pragmatic 
and is preferred to a broad legal reform, either to uniformly concentrate the right 
in a few right-holders or to retroactively remove the intellectual property rights 
altogether. As a theory, a pluralistic approach is preferred to take the alternative 
institutional solutions into account. This study provided an example of how this 
may be framed in the context of fragmented patent rights and coordination.
Each institutional alternative has multiple instruments that may be employed 
to promote positive coordination. For example, if a law reform is considered, co-
ordination of the fragmented rights may be achieved, for example, through rec-
alibrating subject matter, the term, scope, and enforcement of an exclusive right. 
Similarly, private parties may formally engage in coordination as a group, such 
as a firm, patent pools and other collective rights management organizations, or 
informally, by participating in norm communities. Courts may interpret intellec-
tual property laws to recalibrate the rights, pool fragmented rights and give legal 
meaning to various private ordering documents such as contracts, licenses and 
rules of association in the disputes. Administrative agencies such as the patent of-
fice may be initially involved in the coordination by granting the rights and man-
aging the register of patent claims and right-holders after the grant. A competition 
authority may be more active in distinguishing pro-competitive coordination from 
anti-competitive coordination or collusion by market participants, whether they 
are based on exclusive rights or not. 
Whether the coordination mechanism is provided by the legislation, the court, 
the administrative agency or by private ordering in the market, is ultimately a 
question of institutional choice. A multi-institutional comparison thus should be a 
part of the pluralistic theory of intellectual property rights. In this context, this re-
search compared different institutional solutions to the problem of fragmentation.
56
3.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Critically, this study did not use some of the parameters that are advocated in 
multiple institutional comparisons. For example, Komesar’s framework for insti-
tutional design takes the cost of participation for the actors into account – informa-
tion and organization costs.121 The cost of participation may reflect the direct costs 
of organization (e.g. those required to organize dispersed majority interests) or 
procedural participation in the administrative or judicial processes. (e.g. opposi-
tion cost, patent application fee or attorney costs). At the same time there may be 
indirect costs (e.g. information costs) related to participation. 
However, as costs are closely tied to the value of gains, and as long as the value 
of the gains is unknown, all costs are relatively difficult to quantify.  Furthermore, 
as the right encompasses both the public and private value and gain, there are 
externalities related to any participation and the resulting policy choices.  In 
particular, proposing market, with multiple functions but no clear mandates or 
rules, as a regulatory institution of patent creates a further problem in terms of 
participation “costs.” For example, market could mean a market for invention, a 
market for patent, a market for end-user products, or a market for the idea. Since 
market is a private institution, the costs/gains of the participation in the market 
institution are often private costs/gains. In other words, gains or participation in 
the market require further specifications. Even when the function of the market 
has been specified, for example, as a market for the exchange of patents, it is 
unclear whether the cost of participation in such market means the gains of non-
participation or a need to be broader, including all the transaction costs. 
Additionally, private-public aspects of intellectual property question whether 
the cost of participation should be measured based on private costs or the public 
costs of participation. While the private cost of an invention may in a certain sub-
ject matter be known in advance, the market value of a patent right is notoriously 
difficult to calculate.122 Sometimes the value can be specified after the right is used 
in the market, in the license to practice an underlying invention, or assigned, in 
deducing the administrative cost of maintaining such a right. Sometimes, the cost 
of inventing round the patent may be the basis for the market value of the right. 
However, when the patent is neither licensed nor assigned, the value would only 
be known after it has been litigated on the basis of the cost of infringement, and 
most patents are not litigated. At the same time, as a public good with externali-
ties, social value and social cost the right is impossible to calculate in advance. 
Given the uncertainties, the parameters of “participation costs” to market may be 
too difficult to be useful and therefore discarded. 
Furthermore, several private ordering institutions are left out side the scope 
of this research. For example, standard setting organization’s internal rule as a 
governance mechanism deserves further attention. While the research focused 
121 See Komesar (1994), supra note  93 at 8.
122 See for example, Troy, Irene and Raymund Werle (2008) Uncertainty and the Market for Patents, 
MPIfG Working Paper 08 / 2. 
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mainly on patent law specific principles only, the internal rules of standard setting 
organisation over the uses of assertion of patents, how they are implemented in 
practice  and how they affect the behaviour of the related actors in the given in-
dustry sectors needs to be studied further. Likewise, norm communities’ internal 
rules on assertion as well as collective rights management organisations inter-
nal rules’ may deserve separate chapter as alternative institutional governance 
mechanisms. Further research is called for if the effectiveness of these alterna-
tives is empirically proven or if they indicate paradigm shifts in the ways these 
organisations are viewed in law and policy of innovation. 
 The essays have been written over a period of five years and during this proc-
ess there have been some changes in the interpretation of law in the courts in all 
jurisdictions and in the administrative agencies as well. These changes, however, 
do not affect the positions that have been taken by the study, partly because the 
directions of the research were such that the descriptive part of the research 
was to serve as a framework rather than an end in itself. However, updates in 
the descriptive part reflecting some of the changes may improve the research. In 
particular, court-based recalibration of property rights can be approached further 
by exploring recalibration based on the types of remedies available – such as in-
junctive relief or just compensatory relief, in comparative jurisdictions.
The distinction of the courts regarding the coordination of the fragments by 
the end-users and the intermediary firms in the findings of indirect infringement 
liability may influence user innovation models and collaborative innovation.123 
Further exploration would transform the findings of the research into a more 
practical policy recommendation. A future research area could be the empirical 
claims that may support some of the findings of this research. For example, claims 
made that the organizational capability is the reason for the over-protection or 
under-protection resulting from changes in law, which influence firms differently, 
would benefit from empirical studies.124
123 Strandburg, (2008), supra note 70.
124 For a preliminary criterion for this, see Lee, Nari (2008), supra note 87. 
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